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I. INTRODUCTION 
A. MOTIVATION 
Currently, IT systems must be able to support numerous services and applications 
to accomplish the mission of the enterprise.  For improved performance and reliability, 
these services and applications may be distributed across multiple machines in the 
enterprise network.  As with a stand-alone machine, users must also authenticate to these 
networked machines in order to access the applications hosted by them.  If no system-
wide authentication architecture exists, the user may be forced to enter authentication 
information multiple times, at least once for each network application used.  The 
inconvenience of multiple authentications not only causes users to lose productivity, but 
also imposes more administrative overhead in managing the machines to ensure the 
enterprise security policy is enforced by all machines. 
Single sign-on (SSO) has been hailed as a solution to deal with the usability and 
security problems associated with multiple user authentications.  Single sign-on provides 
users the convenience of authenticating once to access applications hosted on multiple 
machines.  In addition, SSO provides the enterprise the ability to centralize authentication 
administration and management.  This helps to ensure that the security policy is 
consistently enforced throughout the organization.  SSO has been used extensively in 
business and academic environments. 
The need for single sign-on extends to environments enforcing multilevel security 
(MLS), such as those found in the military and intelligence communities.  The Monterey 
Security Architecture (MYSEA) is one such environment. MYSEA is a trusted 
distributed networking environment enforcing multi-domain security policies.  Currently, 
MYSEA is designed to support a single server hosting several of applications and a 
limited number of clients that make application requests to the server.  In order to 
accommodate a growing number of MYSEA clients requiring access to a wider variety of 
services, a federation of MYSEA servers is used to handle the service requests [1].   
The introduction of multiple servers into MYSEA introduces security and 
usability problems (as previously described) caused by the user having to sign on 
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multiple times.  A single sign-on solution for the MYSEA federation is needed to offset 
these problems.  A user would only need to authenticate once to a single MYSEA server; 
the user’s credentials can then be used to sign in to the other MYSEA servers that the 
user needs to access. 
B. PURPOSE OF STUDY 
The goal of this thesis is to create a high-level design and specification of a single 
sign-on framework for MYSEA.  Accomplishing this goal involves a review and 
comparison of existing single sign-on architectures and solutions, and a study of the 
current MYSEA design.  To incorporate SSO capabilities into the MYSEA environment, 
a new MYSEA architecture and a concept of operations for SSO needs to be developed.  
Ultimately, security requirements for SSO support in MYSEA will be specified based on 
an analysis of single sign-on threats within a MYSEA context, the environmental 
assumptions, the organizational policies, and the single sign-on objectives for MYSEA.  
Security and functionality are the main driving factors in the design.  Other 
factors considered are performance, reliability, and the feasibility of integration into the 
existing MYSEA MLS network.  The results of this thesis will serve as a basis for future 
design refinements and future development of protocols to facilitate single sign-on in 
MYSEA. 
C. ORGANIZATION OF THESIS 
This thesis is organized into five chapters.  Chapter I first introduces the need for 
single sign-on in the MYSEA project.  Chapter II provides a background on MYSEA, an 
overview and comparison of current SSO architectures, and an analysis of integrating 
SSO into MYSEA.  Chapter III provides the requirements analysis for MYSEA support 
of SSO capabilities.  This chapter includes a high-level design of the new system 
architecture and concept of operations for SSO support.  The threats, assumptions, 
organizational policies, objectives, and system-level requirements for the SSO system are 
also analyzed in Chapter III.  Chapter IV lays out the initial security functional and 
assurance requirements for the SSO system based on the analysis provided in Chapter III.  





This chapter will provide a background on the Monterey Security Architecture 
(MYSEA) and a brief analysis of existing single sign-on architectures applicable to a 
similar architectural context. 
B. MONTEREY SECURITY ARCHITECTURE 
MYSEA [1] provides a distributed networking environment for the enforcement 
of mandatory security policies.  It consists of many low assurance commercial products 
and a small but sufficient number of high assurance elements.  This architecture includes 
the following components and services: the high assurance MYSEA servers, low 
assurance MYSEA clients, legacy single level networks, and dynamic security services.     
1. MYSEA Servers 
Each high assurance MYSEA server consists of a DigitalNet XTS-400 Trusted 
Computer System running the DigitalNet Secure Trusted Operating System (STOP).  The 
STOP kernel is the foundation for the system’s Trusted Computing Base (TCB) which 
enforces a MLS policy using mandatory access control (MAC) and discretionary access 
control (DAC).  The MAC of the STOP complies with the rules in the Bell-LaPadula 
model for information secrecy [2] and the rules in the Biba model [3] for information 
integrity.  Both these models have been proven to be complete and secure with respect to 
confidentiality (the Bell-LaPadula model) and integrity (the Biba model). 
Work on the MYSEA project extended the XTS-400 functionality to include a 
multilevel Trusted Path Server (TPS), a Secure Session Server (SSS), and the Trusted 
Channel Server (TCS).  The TPS component creates a trusted path to a remote MYSEA 
client through which identification and authentication, security session level negotiation, 
password modification, and other trusted path services are performed.  The TPS 
component stores the user session information in the User Database.  The User Database 





status of the session, the security level of the session, and any other security pertinent 
information. The TPS component is responsible for creating, modifying, and deleting the 
entries in the User Database.   
The SSS process is used to launch untrusted application services (such as web 
servers or mail servers) running at the same security level as the MYSEA client 
requesting the service.  The SSS component determines the security level of the 
requesting client by querying the User Database.   
More information on the TPS, SSS, User Database and MYSEA server-client 
interaction can be found in [4].  The TCS will be discussed later in the section on single 
level networks. 
2. MYSEA Clients 
Each MYSEA client consists of an untrusted commercial-off-the-shelf personal 
computer and a Trusted Path Extension (TPE).  These PCs run popular commercial 
operating systems and software applications that are familiar to users.  MYSEA clients 
support users of different security levels, so they need to address the object reuse 
requirement – no residual data pertaining to a subject, logged in at a specific security 
level, remains on the PC after that subject has logged out.  MYSEA PCs are therefore 
thin and stateless; on every user session login, the operating system and all applications 
are loaded from a non-writeable source into volatile memory.  Upon user logout, all 
information in the volatile memory is purged, ensuring no remnants of the previous user’s 
information remains.   
Each TPE is a physical device that is both physically and logically associated with 
a MYSEA client.  Juxtaposed between the client and the LAN, the TPE creates a trusted 
path between user and the remote MYSEA server.  It facilitates the user login process, 
allowing the user to authenticate to the server and set the security level of the current 
session.  Only then is the PC-based client allowed to connect to the local area network 
and access application services on the MYSEA servers. 
3. Single Level Networks 
MYSEA can also interface with pre-existing single level networks.  Through the 
introduction of a Trusted Channel Server (TCS), each network, operating at a single 
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security level, can communicate with the multilevel MYSEA server that hosts the TCS.  
The TCS is similar to the TPE in that the TCS creates a secure, unforgeable link between 
a single level network and a MYSEA server.  The TCS is responsible for managing the 
protocol used in the initiation and termination of each trusted channel in the Protected 
Communications Channel, the channel used for all MLS LAN communications.  The 
TCS is also responsible for associating a sensitivity level for each inbound network 
connection to the MYSEA server and checking the sensitivity level on each outbound 
connection from the MYSEA server.  For information on the design of the TCS, see [5]. 
4. Dynamic Security Services 
The MYSEA server also provides Dynamic Security Services (DSS) for the 
MYSEA environment.  DSS is analogous to the Quality of Services concept in 
networking – DSS is focused on quality of the security service instead of network 
service.  DSS allows for the level of security assurances to be modulated based on the 
environmental conditions.  For example, due to high computational load sensitive but 
unclassified data may be encrypted with a moderate cryptographic algorithm instead of a 
stronger algorithm (which could be used when the computational load is lighter).  A 
prototype incorporating DSS-enabled capabilities with IPsec (Internet Protocol Security) 
was created for use in MYSEA; see [6] for more details on this project and more 
information on DSS.  
C. SINGLE SIGN-ON 
Authentication is the process by which a computer system confirms the identity of 
an individual, usually based on a name and password.   Single sign-on (SSO) is a 
specialized form of authentication that allows a user to authenticate once in a particular 
system and thereafter gain access to multiple systems and services.  Single sign-on 
relieves the burden on the user of having to enter authentication information multiple 
times (e.g., once for every service accessed).  In addition, single sign-on facilitates the 
application of a consistent authentication policy across a domain based on centralized 
management of authentication [7]. 
Numerous single sign-on solutions have been developed by industry and 
academia.  SSO solutions can be organized into two main categories [7]: those that deal 
with a single set of credentials, and those that deal with multiple sets of credentials.  The 
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difference between the two categories is the number of user credentials handled by the 
SSO solution in a deployment environment.  A SSO solution dealing with a single set of 
credentials only has to handle one type of authentication credential per user; for example, 
one common authentication mechanism is a username and password, so in SSO all the 
systems in the domain generally support the same authentication mechanism and accept 
the same password for an individual user.  SSO solutions that handle multiple sets of user 
credentials usually operate across separate domains that may each require a separate 
credential.   For the scope of this thesis, only SSO solutions that manage one credential 
per user will be studied because the same credential is recognized by all MYSEA servers 
in a particular domain.  More information on SSO solutions that deal with multiple sets of 
credentials, such as a list of existing commercial solutions (such as Passgo SSO), can be 
found in [7].  
SSO solutions that handle a single set of credentials can be further categorized 
based on its SSO architecture.  The architectural categories that were examined for this 
thesis were: authentication database replication, token-based SSO, public key 
infrastructure-based SSO, proxy-based SSO, and identity-provider redirection.  A 
description of each of these SSO architectures will be provided in the following section. 
1. Overview of SSO Architectures 
The simplest SSO architecture is authentication database replication.  Clients 
authenticate to a central authentication server and the server stores information about 
currently logged in clients in a session database.  This database is then broadcasted to all 
the servers.  In essence, the authentication server serves as the “master” holder of the 
authentication database and all the other servers are the “slaves”.  When a client contacts 
another server to request a service, the server authenticates the client based on its copy of 
the authentication database and allows the client to connect if the client is found in the 
replicated database. 
In token-based SSO, a client authenticates to an authentication server and gets 
back from the server a cryptographic token.  The client uses the token to prove its identity 
to each application server it wants to access.  The server does some cryptographic 
processing on the token to verify the identity of the client and validity of the token.  
Tokens rely on shared secret keys and represent the trust between the application server 
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and the authentication server.  The classic example of a token-based SSO is the Kerberos 
authentication protocol which involves additional tokens (called “tickets” in Kerberos) 
and additional client-server messages for single sign-on [8]. 
Public key infrastructure (PKI)-based SSO requires that users register themselves 
to a certification authority (CA).  The registration process involves users proving their 
identities with credentials, the generation of private key - public key pairs, and the 
creation of user certificates (which contains the public key for the respective user) by the 
CA.  The client uses the private key (which it only knows) and the certificate issued by 
the CA to generate tokens (similar to those in token-based SSO) that are used for 
authentication and SSO.  The main differences between PKI-based SSO and token-based 
SSO are the user registration process in PKI and the use of asymmetric cryptography in 
PKI vs. the use of symmetric cryptography in token-based SSO.  There is currently no 
PKI-based SSO standard, but many PKI-based SSO solutions have been developed by 
both academia and industry.  An interesting solution that combines token-based 
authentication of Kerberos and PKI is SESAME (Secure European System for 
Applications in a Multivendor Environment).  SESAME also has an option that only uses 
a PKI [9]. 
In a proxy-based SSO, the user authenticates to the central authentication server, 
and the authentication server itself supplies the user credential (e.g., username and 
password) to the appropriate server whenever the user requests to use an application on 
another server.  Proxy-based SSO is used often when servers have different 
authentication mechanisms and the user has to have multiple sets of credentials.  The 
authentication proxy server uses a database to maintain all the credentials for the user.  
However, proxy-based SSO can still be used even when there is one set of credentials per 
user; the database on the proxy would simply maintain a single set of credentials for each 
user.  Proxy-based SSO solutions are popular since they do not require much 
modification to the end systems to enable single sign-on.  One example of a commercial 
proxy-based SSO product is Novell Nsure SecureLogin [10]. 
Identity-provider redirection SSO is used mainly over the Internet to allow users 
to access resources on websites located in different domains.  When an unauthenticated 
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user’s web browser requests a resource from a site, the site redirects them to an identity 
provider.  The user then authenticates to the identity provider and the identity provider 
returns authentication information, such as the user’s password or a ticket, to the user’s 
browser, commonly as a browser cookie.  The user’s browser is then redirected back to 
the initial site (with the resource the user wanted) and presents the authentication 
information to the site.  The site examines the authentication information and allows the 
user to access the resource based on the information.  Microsoft’s Passport is probably 
the most well known example of identity-provider redirection SSO [11]. 
The next section will compare these different SSO architectures across a set of 
factors. 
2. Comparison of SSO Architectures 
The SSO architectures introduced in the previous section were examined and 
compared to each other based on the following criteria: performance bottlenecks, 
scalability mechanisms, implementation requirements, consistency issues, potential 
security problems, and security benefits. 
SSO architectures were analyzed for the existence for any potential performance 
bottlenecks.  SSO performance bottlenecks are the places where network traffic is forced 
to go through a single point during a SSO session, or they may be places where the 
throughput (network or computational) may be slow.  These performance bottlenecks are 
of interest because they can indicate possible failure points or slow points and may affect 
decisions on resource allocation (more resources should be devoted to these bottlenecks 
to improve performance and security).  For authentication replication SSO architectures, 
the performance bottleneck is the frequency of the authentication information updates 
from the master authentication server to the slave servers because the slaves depend 
entirely on the master server to supply them the latest authentication information.    The 
performance bottleneck for token-based SSO is at the central authentication server 
because the client must ask the authentication server for a token for each separate service.  
PKI-based SSO has a performance bottleneck in the checking of expired or revoked 
certificates, a performance factor for PKI in general.  The proxy authentication server is 
the obvious bottleneck for proxy-based SSO since it handles all authentication 
communications between the client and various servers.  For identity-provider redirection 
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SSO, the potential bottleneck is at the identity-provider since all unauthenticated clients 
are redirected to it by all the sites that refer to it for client authentication. 
Scalability mechanisms are those that facilitate the expansion of the number of 
clients that a SSO solution can support.  This implies that there must be a way to increase 
the number of authentication servers in order to handle an increased number of clients.  In 
an authentication information replication SSO architecture, there could be multiple 
authentication servers to handle the load, but these servers will still need to be slaves to a 
master authentication server in charge of all the authentication updates.  A token-based 
SSO can also use replicated authentication servers, but there must be a single master 
authentication server or some other consistency mechanism.  A PKI-based SSO 
architecture is scalable through the use of certificate chaining, allowing a CA to verify 
certificates issued by other CAs.  A proxy-based SSO can increase the number of proxies 
to handle a larger client load.  In identity-provider redirection, the identity provider can 
provide multiple servers to distribute the user authentication workload.  Again, there are 
consistency issues in the proxy-based and identity-provider based SSO with the use of 
multiple authentication servers.   
Another factor examined were the implementation requirements for specific SSO 
architectures.  For authentication replication, the authentication servers and all the other 
servers have to be able to recognize the same authentication format since no additional 
software is being used to support SSO.  Token-based SSO requires clients and servers to 
recognize and use tokens; for example, in Kerberos, applications have to be “kerberized” 
before the application can be used for SSO.  PKI-based SSO also have a similar 
requirement in that clients and servers have to support the use of certificates.  
Implementation requirements for proxy-based SSO are almost minimal, for clients and 
application servers need little, if any, modification – almost all the SSO complexity is 
pushed to the authentication proxy.  Identity-provider redirection SSO also does not 
require complex clients (just standard web browsers), but does require services to be 
web-based.       
Consistency issues were also investigated for the different SSO architectures.  The 
most important thing that needs to be consistent is the authentication database containing 
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the currently authenticated client information.  Any SSO architecture that may employ 
multiple authentication servers (authentication information replication, token-based, 
proxy-based, and identity-provider redirection SSOs) requires a coherent authentication 
database to ensure correct access control of users to the resource or application – the 
distributed information must be managed such that the effective authentication policy is 
the same as provided by a single authentication database.  Token-based SSO also may 
have expiration dates on the tokens, so the expired tokens have to be consistently denied 
by all servers, and the use of timestamps in some token-based SSO solutions (like 
Kerberos) require synchronized clocks.  PKI-based SSO has consistency issues with the 
revocation of certificates, which, like tokens, need to be uniformly denied by every 
server. 
Another factor examined was the security benefits of adopting a particular SSO 
architecture.  Authentication replication SSO provides increased availability because 
authentication information is stored in multiple places (slave servers), so if the 
authentication server were to fail, a slave server may be able to take its place.  Increased 
availability can be a security benefit for the other SSO architectures that can employ 
multiple authentication servers (token-based, PKI-based, proxy-based, and redirection to 
identity-provider SSOs).  The timestamps in token-based SSO provide protection against 
replay attacks in which an attacker presents a previously used token.  PKI-based SSO 
allows for the mutual authentication of the client to the server and server to the client 
through the examination of both server and client certificates.  The security benefits in a 
proxy-based or identity-provider redirection SSO architecture depends on the security 
mechanisms enforced at the proxy or identity provider since either of them can 
incorporate tokens or certificates in the authentication process. 
Potential security problems for these SSO architectures were also explored.  
Again, in architectures where any authentication replication takes place, the use of 
outdated authentication information by a server can lead to unauthorized user access.  It 
is also obvious that the compromise of an authentication server for all of these 
architectures would be disastrous as any secret or private keys may be exposed.  Potential 
security problems particular to token-based SSOs usually involve client-side caching of 
the tokens, since these tokens may be stolen or reused if the clients are not secure.  
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Token-based SSOs may also use timestamps, requiring all clocks to be synchronized 
securely to avoid servers synchronizing to a rogue server’s clock.  Both proxy-based and 
identity-provider redirection SSO may be susceptible to man-in-the-middle attacks in 
which clients expose their passwords to an attacker’s machine posing as the proxy, 
application server, or the identity provider.   Identity-provider redirection SSO also has a 
serious problem of clients not having to authenticate before requesting a service.  In the 
other SSO architectures, clients are forced to authenticate before attempting to contact an 
application server.    
Table 1 summarizes the observations made for the various SSO architectures in 
regards to performance bottlenecks, scalability mechanisms, and implementation 
requirements.  Table 2 summarizes the observations based on consistency issues, security 
benefits, and potential security problems. 
The evaluation of whether a particular SSO architecture is “better” than another, 
and the choice of a using particular SSO architecture, can only be made in context of the 
environment and organization that will use SSO.  For this thesis, the environment is that 
used in MYSEA, and the next section will include an evaluation and choice of SSO 
architecture.  
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Table 2. Comparison of SSO architectures (cont.) 
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3. Conclusions of SSO Study 
Although many SSO approaches were studied for this work, none fully satisfied 
the current needs for the MYSEA project.  In particular, MYSEA operates in a MLS 
environment with both mandatory and discretionary access controls; these security 
characteristics were not found in the SSO solutions that were reviewed.  Another security 
assumption for MYSEA is that clients are assumed to be untrusted, thus the requirement 
of the use of Trusted Path Extensions to perform security-critical transactions (e.g., 
authentication).  To provide assurance that the TPEs are functioning securely and 
correctly, security analysis of TPEs is required.  This analysis requires that the code for 
the TPE be understandable and is facilitated through minimization of the code base.  
Nearly all the above solutions require a significant amount of code for the clients.  In 
addition, it is desired that the MYSEA servers be minimally impacted by the introduction 
of a SSO solution, but again, most of the SSO solutions studied required drastic changes 
to the server code. 
For the reasons discussed above, a new single sign-on framework for the MYSEA 
environment will need to be developed.  The remainder of this thesis is devoted to 
defining this framework for SSO in the MYSEA environment. 
D. SUMMARY 
This chapter presented a brief background on MYSEA and its components, an 
overview of single sign-on concepts and architectures, and a comparison of various SSO 
architectures.  It concluded with the decision that a different kind of SSO architecture 
will need to be constructed to meet the needs of the MYSEA environment.  The next 
chapter will describe the new SSO architecture and concept of operations, as well as 
provide an analysis of the requirements imposed by the new SSO solution. 
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III. MYSEA SSO REQUIREMENTS ANALYSIS 
A. INTRODUCTION 
The existing Monterey Security Architecture (MYSEA) does not support single 
sign-on (SSO) capabilities.  This chapter describes a framework in which SSO can be 
incorporated into MYSEA.  First, the system architecture and concept of operations 
(CONOPS) for SSO support is defined, including situations where some part of the SSO 
system has failed.  This is followed by a description of an analysis of the threats to the 
system, based on the environmental assumptions, and a description of the organizational 
security policies.  From these assumptions, threats, and policies, a set of objectives will 
be determined, and these objectives are used to derive the requirements for SSO support 
in MYSEA.   
B. SYSTEM ARCHITECTURE 
1. System-Supported Services 
The MYSEA system architecture involves the management of the following 
elements: application services, authentication, trusted path extension, trusted channel, and 
service management.  Application services are the user applications hosted by MYSEA 
servers, such as web, mail, and network file system.  Authentication is the verification 
that a person is a legitimate user in the system and is used to control access to resources 
requested on MYSEA servers.  Authentication in MYSEA also requires validating the 
session level of the user at which the user wishes to operate.  Authentication may be 
distributed among multiple servers.  The distribution of authentication to provide single 
sign-on is the main focus of this thesis. 
Trusted path extension is the means in which a user located at a remote MYSEA 
client can establish a trusted path with the MYSEA server.  This mechanism is 
implemented by a high assurance device called the Trusted Path Extension (TPE) that is 
attached to each MYSEA client and is an extension of the Trusted Computing Base 
(TCB) on the high assurance MYSEA server.  Secure communications between any two 
components, (e.g., client to server, server to server) is achieved through a trusted channel.  
The trusted channel protects communications with respect to confidentiality, integrity, 
and authenticity.  In the existing MYSEA design, the trusted channel is called the 
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Protected Communications Channel (PCC).  Service management is the ability to 
configure the system services, such as the allocation of specific applications to particular 
servers and certain security within the overall system (e.g., the cryptographic algorithm 
used in communications).  Service management is used to dynamically control the 
parameters of these services based on the operational conditions which can change over 
time (for example, component failures). 
2. System Components 
Presently, there is only a single MYSEA server that authenticates and services 
MYSEA clients.  Additional MYSEA servers may be added in the future to support a 
larger number of clients and applications.  Assuming no modifications to the current 
MYSEA authentication scheme for each application requested, the user operating a 
MYSEA client equipped with a Trusted Path Extension (TPE) must authenticate to each 
individual MYSEA server hosting the desired application.  For example, if the user 
wishes to use three different applications, each hosted on a separate machine, the user is 
required to authenticate at least three times, once for each server.  The person is forced 
repeatedly to enter authentication information, e.g., type her password, within a single 
session, potentially causing frustration.  The root of this frustration is the fact that the 
MYSEA servers in the local area network (LAN) are presently designed to be 
autonomous, isolated machines with little if any communication amongst them.   
The addition of single sign-on capabilities (SSO) in MYSEA forces these servers 
to be connected as a federation, rather than a loose grouping of separate entities.  In this 
federation, MYSEA servers will be share authentication data for facilitation of SSO.  One 
of the MYSEA servers in the federation will be assigned the role of Authentication 
Server (AUS), the central focal point of authentication.  All MYSEA clients, through the 
TPEs, will authenticate directly to the AUS.  A person using the MYSEA client equipped 
with a TPE need only authenticate once at a particular session level to the AUS in order 
to access several network applications that may be hosted on separate MYSEA servers.   
But the TPE will need to know what server to contact based on the application requested, 
so the TPE must now become protocol-aware.  In contrast, the TPE in the current scheme 
handles all application requests by sending them to the same MYSEA server – the TPE is 
completely oblivious to the type of application that was requested.  
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Each of the other MYSEA servers, which host one or more network applications, 
will be known as an Application Management Server (AMS).  The AUS can also be an 
AMS if it too hosts an application.  An AMS provides services only to MYSEA users 
who have been authenticated.  Previously, the AMS directly authenticated the users, 
requiring the user to enter the authentication information.  But in this new federation, the 
AMS can query the AUS for user authentication information.  The fact that a user has 
been authenticated at a particular session level has been captured by the AUS and this 
fact can be shared amongst the AMSes when they need to know if a particular user 
requesting their application has been authenticated. 
The MYSEA clients with TPEs, the MYSEA authentication server, and the 
various MYSEA application servers are networked in a multilevel secure (MLS) local 
area network (LAN).  The TPEs control each client’s access to the LAN, and the TPE-
AUS and TPE-AMS communications occur on this MLS network.  The server-to-server 
communications, i.e., the AUS-AMS communications, also use the same MLS LAN.  In 
the future, the server-to-server communications may occur on a separate LAN that is 
primarily used for the sharing of user authentication and session information, but the 
analysis and design of such a mechanism is out of the scope of this thesis. 
In summary, the system architecture will now consist of MYSEA clients equipped 
with protocol-aware TPEs and a federation of MYSEA servers - a single Authentication 
Server (AUS) and a number of Application Management Servers (AMSes).  The TPEs 
communicate with the AUS and AMSes through a MLS LAN.  This LAN is also used for 
the AUS and AMS communications.  Figure 1 shows the new MYSEA system 
architecture.  The next section elaborates how the TPEs, AUS, and AMSes interact to 
accomplish single sign-on.  
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Figure 1.   New MYSEA System Architecture 
 
C. CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS 
1. Initial User Authentication 
Users must authenticate to the Authentication Server (AUS) prior to accessing the 
network and any network applications.  A Trusted Path Extension (TPE), attached to each 
client machine, creates a secure, unforgeable communications path to the AUS that is 
used for user authentication and other security services.  The user authentication process 
is depicted in Figure 2.  For the sake of brevity, some steps in the authentication process 
have been consolidated. 
First, the user presses the secure attention key (SAK) on the TPE.  This causes the 
TPE to invoke a trusted path to the AUS and establish a secure connection with the AUS 
(Step 1).  Next, the AUS issues to the user on the TPE a login prompt requesting the 
username and password (Step 2).  The user then enters her username and password on the 
TPE, which sends these authentication items to the AUS (Step 3).  The AUS checks the 
user’s credentials; if they are valid, the AUS sends the TPE a message indicating the user 
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Figure 2.   User Authentication Process 
 
Next, the user presses the SAK on the TPE (Step 5 in Figure 3) and the AUS 
returns to the TPE a menu of options (Step 6), including an option to allow the user to 
start a session and an option to change the session level.  If the user decides to operate at 
the default session level and wishes to use an application, the user selects the ‘Run’ 
option in (Step 7a) and in response, the AUS returns to the TPE an Application Mapping 
Database (Step 8a) that tells the TPE which server to contact for a particular network 
application (Step 9a).  The existence of the Application Mapping Database (AMDB) is a 
new element in the MYSEA design, a part of the Service Management for MYSEA.  
More information about the AMDB will be given in the system requirements section of 
this chapter.   
 
 



























Figure 3.   Selecting the Run Option 
 
 If the user wishes to change session levels, the user selects that option (Step 7b in 
Figure 4), and the AUS sends a prompt for the session level desired (Step 8b).  The user 
enters the session level she wants to work at for the current session and the TPE sends 
this to the AUS (Step 9b).  The AUS checks the user’s clearance and if the user’s 
clearance allows the requested level, returns a message to the TPE that the user is now 
operating at the new session level (Step 10b).  If the user is ready to run an application, 
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Figure 4.   Changing the Session Level 
 
At this point, the user on the MYSEA client is ready to run applications serviced 
by various MYSEA servers.  The next section details the single sign-on process that 
allows the user to access applications on multiple servers.   
2. Single Sign-On Process 
After a user has successfully authenticated to the AUS, the user can access 
network applications running on the various Application Management Servers (AMS) 
that are part of the MYSEA MLS LAN.  (The AUS could also be an AMS if it also hosts 
an application.)  Figure 5 shows the process of the user accessing an application on the 
AMS.  This is a single sign-on process because the authentication of the user to the AMS 
does not involve the user reentering her username and password. 
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Figure 5.   User Accessing an AMS Application 
 
The user opens a network application.  For example, the user opens the browser 
on the client machine to do web browsing.  The application request causes the client 
machine to generate a network packet that specifies the type of the service requested (i.e., 
the destination port in the transport layer header).  The TPE, which controls the client’s 
access to the LAN, takes the packet, examines the service port, consults the Application 
Mapping Database for the address of the AMS hosting the requested service, and 
modifies the destination address of the packet to that of the appropriate AMS.  The TPE 
then sends the packet to that AMS (Step 1).  The ability of the TPE to examine the 
network packets at the transport layer level to determine the destination service port and 
redirect the packet to an AMS hosting the service is a feature that is not present in the 
current TPE design.  
The AMS receives the network application request and checks if the ID of the 
TPE the user is working on is already present in its local authentication database.  The 
authentication database on the AMS contains current session information of users who 
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have authenticated to the AUS and have accessed this AMS at least once during their 
current session.  The current session information in the authentication database includes 
the user’s current session level, the TPE ID associated with that user, and any other user 
attributes to support the discretionary access control (DAC) policy.  Since this is the 
user’s first application request to this AMS, the TPE ID of the user will not be present in 
the AMS’s authentication database.  In order to determine the login status of the user, the 
AMS must consult the AUS regarding the requesting user (Step 2) based on the user’s 
TPE ID.   
The AUS checks if the TPE ID is in its authentication database, which contains all 
authenticated users, their corresponding TPE IDs, and their current session level.  The 
AUS then sends the AMS the results of the check – an affirmative that the TPE ID in 
question is present in the database, meaning that the user has been authenticated to the 
AUS using a TPE with that TPE ID, along with the username, the user’s current session 
level, and other relevant user attributes (Step 3). 
The AMS adds the user’s TPE ID, username, her session level, and other pertinent 
user attributes to its local authentication database.  The AMS then serves the user’s 
application request (Step 4).  On subsequent application requests within the same session, 
the AMS will only need to check its local authentication database to find the user’s TPE 
ID, username, her current session information, and other user attributes that the AMS 
uses for allowing access to its services. 
If the user wishes to use an application on another AMS, the above four steps are 
repeated.  Single sign-on is achieved because the user does not have to repeatedly 
authenticate (i.e., enter a password) for each application server she has accessed. 
3. User Session Status Update Process  
Whenever the user wishes to change the status of her session, either by switching 
to a different session level or logging out and closing a session, the user presses the 
secure attention key on the TPE.  Again, the TPE creates a trusted path to the AUS.  The 
AUS sends to the TPE a menu of options which include logout, session level change, and 
resume the current session.  The user enters the desired option into the TPE and the TPE 
sends the option to the AUS.  
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• If the option is to resume, the TPE is instructed by the AUS to continue 
with the current session.  The AUS may also send to the TPE an updated 
Application Mapping Database (AMDB) to reflect any changes to the 
status of the AMSes.  
•  If the option is to logout, the AUS instructs the TPE to tear down all 
application connections associated with that user and to purge its 
memory.  (A similar process must be done on the client machine to ensure 
that “all information is irretrievably removed from those objects/subjects” 
before its allocation for reuse [12]. However, the mechanisms to perform 
this are beyond the scope of this thesis.)  The AUS then updates its 
authentication database to reflect that the user has logged out.  
•  If the option is to change the session level, the AUS sends the TPE a 
prompt for the user to enter the desired session level.  The user enters the 
session level which the TPE sends to the AUS.  The AUS checks if the 
session level is valid for the user - if it is a valid level, the AUS sends the 
command to the TPE to tear down any existing application connections, 
purge its memory, and run at the new session level.  Again, the AUS may 
send a new AMDB to the TPE if the AMDB has changed. 
In the case of logout or session level change, the AUS notifies the various AMSes 
accessed by the user in the last session that the user’s login status has changed and to 
update their local authentication databases by flushing the user’s old authentication 
information in their local databases.  (This requires the AUS to keep track for each user 
of all the servers accessed in the current session.  Whenever an AMS requests the user’s 
authentication information from the AUS, the AUS adds the requesting AMS to the list of 
AMSes the user has accessed in the current session.)  If the user changed session levels 
and wants to use an application on a particular AMS, the user will need to be 
authenticated to the servicing AMS through the single sign-on process as described in the 
previous section.  In other words, the AMS will need to consult the AUS when the user 
makes the initial request because the user’s current record will not be present in its local 
authentication database. 
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4. Failure Recovery 
The MYSEA single sign-on system must be robust enough to handle a number of 
failure scenarios.  These scenarios include TPE failure, Authentication Server failure, 
Application Management Server failure, Service Management failure, and network 
failure.  Combinations of failure scenarios are also possible but the analysis of such 
combinations is left as future work. 
TPE failure is when the TPE is in an unknown, unstable state and either is 
unresponsive or powered off.  In this scenario, the TPE is no longer communicating with 
the AUS or any AMS during a user’s session (the user has not logged out from a 
particular client with a TPE).  After an administratively defined TPE timeout interval, the 
AUS will query each of the AMSes accessed by the user for recent activity.  Each of 
those AMSes will check the activity timeouts (administratively defined) each has set for 
the TPE in question.   If the timeout period on an AMS has not occurred, the AMS replies 
to the AUS that the TPE is active, and the AUS will reset the TPE timeout interval to the 
maximum defined by the administrator since the TPE is still functioning normally.  If all 
the AMSes reply that the user has not been active, an attempt to contact the TPE at the 
network level will be made by the AUS.  In the case that the TPE cannot be contacted 
through the TPE heartbeat mechanism, the AUS will remove the failed TPE and the 
logged in user from the authentication database.  The AUS also will alert the AMSes that 
have served the user in the current session to remove the user from their local 
authentication databases.  Future work includes designing this TPE heartbeat mechanism 
to detect TPE failure at the network level.    
AMSes may also be able to detect TPE failures and inform the AUS of the failure, 
but this scenario is left as future work.  For the current work, the AUS is responsible for 
detecting TPE failure and informing AMSes of the failure.  
It is also possible that a failure may occur at the Authentication Server.  The 
failure of the AUS will be detected by an AMS requesting a user’s authentication 
information because the AUS will not respond to the AMS’s request.  The AMS will 
determine that the AUS has failed after an administratively set number of non-responses 
by the AUS.  The AMS may also detect that the AUS is down during heartbeat 
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monitoring.  Heartbeat monitoring is used to determine if a party is alive, in this case the 
AUS.  The details of the heartbeat monitoring mechanisms is out of the scope of this 
thesis but will be addressed in future work.    
In the case of AUS failure, no new users will be able to authenticate to the AUS 
and access the LAN.  An authenticated user will not be able to access an AMS if the 
AMS did not contact the AUS for her authentication status before the AUS failed, nor can 
an authenticated user change her session level during an AUS failure.  Active users, 
authenticated users who are actively using one or more applications, will be able to 
continue using those applications, but will not be able to change session levels or connect 
to new applications running on servers that were not accessed by the user before the 
failure in the AUS.  Idle users still connected to an AMS will be disconnected by the 
AMS after an administratively set timeout interval.  Increasing the availability of the 
AUS and AMS services may include appointing an AMS to serve as an alternate AUS, 
but the design of this approach is not in the scope of this work. 
An Application Management Server failure can happen if any part of the AMS 
fails, such as the server application, server operating system, hardware, etc.  AMS 
failures can be detected through heartbeat monitoring mechanisms between the AMSes 
and the AUS.  The AUS will update its Application Mapping Database (AMDB) and 
send the TPEs that were using the failed AMS the updated AMDB.  In addition, a secure 
attention key press on the TPE will also trigger receipt of the updated AMDB. 
Service Management failure can occur if the Application Mapping Database sent 
to a TPE is not valid, i.e., the TPE is directed to an AMS that is not hosting the 
application as specified in the database.  To deal with this inconsistency, the TPE must 
contact the AUS, through the user’s pressing of the SAK to obtain the latest AMDB 
before starting the session with an AMS.  However it is possible that the AMDB may 
become inconsistent after the TPE has downloaded the database.  The handling of this 
type of failure is outside the scope of this thesis and will be discussed in the future work 
section.   
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The concept of operations (CONOPS) for the single sign-on system in MYSEA 
was described.  The CONOPS included normal-use as well as failure scenarios.  The next 
section defines the single sign-on system. 
D. SINGLE SIGN-ON SYSTEM DESCRIPTION 
The Common Criteria version 2.2 [12] was used as the basis for generating the 
requirements for the single sign-on system.  The Common Criteria provides a standard 
methodology for the specification of security requirements for IT products and their 
evaluation at specific security assurance levels.  For more information on the Common 
Criteria, refer to the website listed in [13]. 
The Common Criteria term for the IT product that is to be defined and evaluated 
is Target of Evaluation (TOE), and the part of the TOE that performs security functions 
of the TOE, such as identification and authentication, is called the TOE Security 
Functions (TSF).  Before any security requirements can be generated, the TOE and TSF 
must be clearly defined.  The TOE, within the MYSEA single sign-on context, is the 
Authentication Server (AUS).  The AUS is a specialized MYSEA server so it runs on the 
same hardware platform and operating system as any MYSEA server (DigitalNet XTS-
400 running the STOP operating system).  This TOE includes the following MYSEA 
services: Trusted Path Service (TPS), Secure Session Service (SSS) if it also acts as an 
AMS, Dynamic Security Service (DSS), and Trusted Channel Service (TCS), as well as 
any administrative tools.  The TPS, SSS, DSS, TCS were described in the Chapter II.  
Other MYSEA servers also contain these MYSEA services, so the AUS’s single sign-on 
capabilities distinguishes it from these other MYSEA servers.  The TOE Security 
Functions (TSF) for this work includes the hardware, operating system, SSS, and TPS 
components of the AUS.  
The AUS performs all remote user authentication and session handling.  The 
information about authenticated users is stored in databases on the AUS, and this 
information is shared by the AUS with the various Application Management Servers 
(AMS).  The AUS is also responsible for performing service management activities such 
as giving each TPE (attached to a MYSEA client) the Application Mapping Database that 
gives the location of the AMS hosting the service and verifying that the AMSes are 
active. 
28
For this work, the AUS is a single MYSEA server.  There may be multiple AUSes 
for increased scalability and reliability, but the analysis and design of a SSO system with 
multiple AUSes, such as the load balancing and consistency mechanisms, is left as future 
work.  However, this current design, with one AUS, must include requirements that will 
allow the extension of the design to multiple AUSes. 
The TOE, or AUS, is also a component in a larger system – the MYSEA MLS 
LAN.  In this context, the AUS supports system-wide services, such as SSO and 
heartbeat monitoring.  This work focuses on specifying requirements for the AUS to 
support single sign-on.  Preliminary requirements for heartbeat monitoring will also be 
specified, but a more detailed specification for heartbeat monitoring is out of the scope of 
this work.  The guidance on how to specify the TOE as a stand-alone system as well as a 
component in a larger system was based on the U.S. Government Directory Protection  
Profile for Medium Robustness Environments [14] which specified requirements for a 
directory server (such as that used in a public key infrastructure) that is both a separate 
system and a component in a larger system. 
The remainder of this chapter will detail the assumptions, threat analysis, 
organizational security policies, objectives and system level requirements for the single 
sign-on system.  The Consistency Instruction Manual for Medium Robustness 
Environments [15] and the Directory Protection Profile [14] were referenced in 
developing these components.  It is standard practice to directly use sections from the 
CIM and other relevant Protection Profiles when applicable to the current system.         
E. ASSUMPTIONS 
The table below lists the assumptions of the Authentication Server, or TOE, 
security environment.  Assumptions are aspects of the environment that the TOE is not 
able to control, such as physical security and the trustworthiness of the remote 
components (e.g., TPEs and AMSes) that interact with the TOE. 
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It is assumed that the IT environment 
provides the TOE with appropriate physical 
security, commensurate with the value of the IT 





The accreditation process will ensure 
that the procuring organization will manage and 
protect the remote components in a manner that 
is commensurate with the protection 




Remote component processes that 
interact with the TOE are trusted to comply 
with the security requirements levied upon them 




All network components are vetted with 
the appropriate level of trust in order to properly 
enforce the network security policy. 
Table 3. System Assumptions 
 
F. THREAT ANALYSIS 
The threat analysis involves identifying the relevant threats to the TOE.  A table 
of threats was compiled using the Consistency Instruction Manual for Medium 
Robustness Environments [15].  These threats were examined for their relevance to the 
Authentication Server and those that were appropriate to this TOE are described to 
address specific aspects of Authentication Server. 
Threat Name Threat Description 
T.ADMIN_ERROR 
 
An administrator may incorrectly install or 
configure the TOE, or install a corrupted TOE resulting 
in ineffective security mechanisms. 
T.ADMIN_ROGUE An administrator’s intentions may become 




A malicious user or process may view audit 
records, cause audit records to be lost or modified, or 
prevent future audit records from being recorded, thus 
masking a user’s action. 
T.CONFIG_CORRUPT 
 
A malicious process, user, or external IT entity 




A malicious user or process may cause keys, data 
or executable code associated with the cryptographic 
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functionality to be inappropriately accessed (viewed, 
modified, or deleted), thus compromising the 




A malicious user or process may observe or 
modify user or TSF data transmitted between the TOE 
and a remote entity. 
T.MASQUERADE 
 
A malicious user, process, or external IT entity 
may masquerade as an authorized entity in order to gain 
unauthorized access to data or TOE resources. 
T.POOR_DESIGN 
 
Unintentional or intentional errors in 
requirements specification or design of the TOE may 
occur, leading to flaws that may be exploited by a 
malicious user or program. 
T.POOR_IMPLEMENTATION 
 
Unintentional or intentional errors in 
implementation of the TOE design may occur, leading to 
flaws that may be exploited by a malicious user or 
program. 
T.POOR_TEST Lack of or insufficient tests to demonstrate that 
all TOE security functions operate correctly (including 
in a fielded TOE) may result in incorrect TOE behavior 





A user may gain inappropriate access to the TOE 
by replaying authentication information, or may cause 
the TOE to be inappropriately configured by replaying 
TSF data or security attributes (e.g., captured as 




A user or process may gain unauthorized access 
to data through reallocation of TOE resources from one 




A malicious process or user may block others 
from system or network resources (e.g., network 





A malicious user, process, or external IT entity 
may misrepresent itself as the TOE to obtain 
identification and authentication data. 
T.TSF_ COMPROMISE  
 
A malicious user or process may cause TSF data 
or executable code to be inappropriately accessed 
(viewed, modified, or deleted). 
T.UNATTENDED_SESSION 
 




A user may gain access to user data for which 






The administrator may fail to notice potential 
security violations, thus limiting the administrator’s 




When the TOE is initially started or restarted 
after a failure, the security state of the TOE may be 
unknown. 
Table 4. System Threats 
 
G. ORGANIZATIONAL SECURITY POLICIES 
The policies of the organization define how the system is to be used, which 
includes the limits as well as capabilities.  The table below shows the policies needed to 
establish single sign-on capabilities in a medium-robustness environment. 
Policy Name Policy Description 
P.ACCESS_BANNER 
 
The TOE shall display an initial banner 
describing restrictions of use, legal agreements, or any 
other appropriate information to which users consent 
by accessing the TOE. 
P.ACCOUNTABILITY 
 
The authorized users of the TOE shall be held 
accountable for their actions within the TOE. 
P.LOCAL_ADMIN_ACCESS 
 
Administrators shall be able to administer the 
TOE locally only. 
P.CRYPTOGRAPHY 
 
The TOE shall use NIST FIPS validated 
cryptography as a baseline with additional NSA-
approved methods for key management (i.e.; 
generation, access, distribution, destruction, handling, 
and storage of keys), and for cryptographic operations 
(i.e.; encryption, decryption, signature, hashing, key 
exchange, and random number generation services). 
P.SINGLE_SIGN_ON 
 
Authorized users shall be able to access 





The TOE shall undergo appropriate 
independent vulnerability analysis and penetration 
testing to demonstrate that the TOE is resistant to an 
attacker possessing a medium attack potential. 











1. Security Objectives for the System 
The following table lists the security objectives for the system in order to address 
the threats and policies.  These objectives will lead to the generation of security 
requirements to achieve these objectives. 
Objective Name Objective Description 
O.AUDIT_GENERATION 
 
The TOE will provide the capability to 
detect and create records of security-relevant 




The TOE will provide administrator roles 
to isolate administrative actions, and to make the 




The TOE will provide the capability to 
protect audit information by controlling access 




The TOE will provide the capability to 
selectively view audit information, and alert the 




The configuration of, and all changes to, 
the TOE and its development evidence will be 




The TOE will provide a capability to test 
the TSF to ensure the correct operation of the 
TSF in its operational environment. 
O.CRYPTOGRAPHY 
 
The TOE will use NIST FIPS 140-2 
validated cryptographic services. 
O.DISPLAY_BANNER 
 
The TOE will display an advisory 




The TOE will provide a mode from 





The TOE will provide all the functions 
and facilities necessary to support the 
administrators in their management of the 
security of the TOE, and restrict these functions 
and facilities from unauthorized use. 
O.MEDIATE 
 
The TOE must protect user data in 
accordance with its security policy. 
O.PROTECT_IN_TRANSIT 
 
The TSF will protect user and TSF data 
when it is in transit from the TOE to another 
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The TOE will provide a means to detect 
and reject the replay of authentication data as 




The TOE will ensure that any 
information contained in a protected resource is 




The TOE will provide mechanisms that 
mitigate attempts to exhaust CPU resources 




The TOE will provide administrators 
with the necessary information for secure 
delivery and management of the TOE. 
O. ROBUST_TOE_ACCESS The TOE will provide mechanisms that 
control a user’s logical access to the TOE and to 





The TSF will maintain a domain for its 
own execution that protects itself and its 
resources from external interference, tampering 




The TOE will provide a means to ensure 
users will be able to access services on a 





The TOE will provide either centralized 
or distributed user identification and 




The TOE will be designed using sound 
design principles and techniques. The TOE 
design, design principles, and design techniques 




The implementation of the TOE will be 
an accurate instantiation of its design, and is 




The TOE will undergo appropriate 
security functional testing that demonstrates the 




The TOE will provide reliable time 
stamps and the capability for the administrator to 




The TOE will provide a means to 
establish protected communications with remote 






The TOE will provide a means to ensure 
that users are not communicating with some 
other entity pretending to be the TOE when 




The TOE will provide users with the 






The TOE will undergo appropriate 
independent vulnerability analysis and 
penetration testing to demonstrate the design and 
implementation of the TOE does not allow 
attackers with medium attack potential to violate 
the TOE’s security policies. 
Table 6. System Security Objectives 
 
2. Security Objectives for the Environment 
The security objectives of the environment state the goals that must be addressed 
by the IT environment.  Table 7 is a summary of the objectives that are imposed on the 
SSO environment. 




The security administrator must 
ensure that the appropriate level of trust 
has been established among all 
components such that network security 
policies are understood and enforced. 
OE.PHYSICAL 
 
Physical security will be provided 
within the domain for the value of the IT 
assets protected by the operating system 
and the value of the stored, processed, 
and transmitted information. 
OE.PROTECTED_COMMUNICATIONS_
CHANNEL 
Remote authorized IT entities 
must provide a means to communicate 




The accreditation process will 
ensure that the procuring organization 
will manage and protect the remote 
components (i.e., Application 
Management Servers, Trusted Path 
Extensions) in a manner that is 
commensurate with the protection 
provided for the TOE. 
OE.REMOTE_COMPONENT_FUNCTION
ALITY 
Remote component trusted 
processes will be constructed to comply 
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 with the security requirements levied 
upon them by the TOE. 
Table 7. Operational Environment Security Objectives 
I. SYSTEM LEVEL REQUIREMENTS 
This section discusses an initial set of requirements for single sign-on in the 
MYSEA environment.  The system level requirements consist of single sign-on 
requirements and service management requirements.  These requirements are further 
divided among separate requirements for the Authentication Server, Trusted Path 
Extensions (TPE), Application Management Servers, administrators and the users.  Any 
requirement that depends on communications between two entities (e.g., TPE and AUS, 
AUS and AMS, etc.) implies that the entities communicate through the Protected 
Communications Channel (PCC).  
1. Single Sign-on Requirements 
a. Authentication Server Requirements 
• Before user authentication, the AUS shall authenticate TPEs based 
on TPE ID stored in the Allowed TPE Database. 
• The AUS shall authenticate users communicating through valid 
TPEs based on a user ID and password stored in the password file 
(managed by the operating system). 
• Upon the SAK press, the AUS shall provide to valid TPEs with 
authenticated users a menu of available functions that the users can 
invoke.  The list of functions includes: change session level, start a 
session with an AMS, and logout.  
• The AUS shall maintain the AMDB.  This database shall contain 
information about available services provided by different AMSes. 
• The AUS shall construct a subset of the Application Mapping 
Database (AMDB) for each TPE.  The AUS shall distribute the 
AMDB subset to the TPE upon successful user authentication.  
The AUS shall send AMDB updates to the TPE when the SAK is 
pressed during a user’s session. 
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• The AUS shall maintain the User Database to keep track of the 
status of currently authenticated users.  User status information 
includes the user ID, TPE ID, current session level, and any other 
user attributes used for access control decisions. 
• The AUS shall be able to receive user session information requests 
from AMSes.   
• Before responding with a user’s session information from the User 
Database, the AUS shall authenticate AMSes based on the AMS 
ID.   
• For each user, the AUS shall maintain a list of AMSes that have 
requested the user’s session information.  The AUS shall use this 
list to inform the appropriate AMSes of user logout or session level 
change and to inform TPEs of changes in their AMDB subsets 
(i.e., AMS no longer servicing an application). 
• The AUS shall have configurable auditing capabilities.  The events 
that may be audited include: user authentication, AMS user 
authentication request, and distribution of the AMDB subset. 
b. Trusted Path Extension Requirements 
• The TPE shall provide an interface for the user to authenticate and 
negotiate a session level with the AUS. 
• The TPE shall communicate the information provided by the user 
to the AUS. 
• The TPE shall provide access to the LAN only after the user has 
authenticated to the AUS. 
• The TPE shall be able to receive a subset of the Application 
Mapping Database (AMDB) from the AUS upon successful user 
authentication. 
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• The TPE shall send an acknowledgement of the receipt of the 
AMDB subset to the AUS.   
• The TPE shall route user application requests to the appropriate 
AMS based on the AMDB received from the AUS. 
c.  Application Management Server Requirements 
• The AMS shall validate the user before servicing the user’s 
application request. 
• The AMS shall make the decision to service the requests based on 
the user session information (e.g., user ID, TPE ID, current session 
level) in its cached User Database.   
• If the user’s information is not in the AMS’s User Database cache, 
the AMS shall contact the AUS to obtain the most current 
authentication information of the user and store it in the AMS’s 
User Database cache.   
• The AMS shall be able to receive user session updates from the 
AUS and update the AMS’s User Database cache as appropriate. 
• The AMS shall notify the AUS when a service becomes 
unavailable. 
d. Administrator Requirements 
• The administrator shall configure the databases on the AUS such 
that the AUS is able to authenticate TPEs, users, and AMSes. 
• The administrator shall configure the TPEs and AMSes such that 
they will be able to communicate with the AUS. 
e. User Requirements 
• All users shall be registered with the administrator before they are 





2. Service Management Requirements 
a. Authentication Server Requirements 
• The AUS shall maintain consistency of the Application Mapping 
Database.  The AUS shall monitor the AMSes for liveliness and 
the types of applications actively hosted by the AMS. 
• The AUS shall detect AMS failure and notify the affected TPEs in 
a timely manner by sending them updated AMDB subsets. 
• The AUS shall maintain the consistency of the subsets of the 
AMDB on the TPEs. 
• The AUS shall query the appropriate AMSes when a TPE has not 
communicated with the AUS within the set timeout interval. 
• The AUS shall detect TPE failure and contact the appropriate 
AMSes to remove the user associated with the TPE from their 
local User Database caches. 
b. Trusted Path Extension Requirements 
• The TPE shall update its copy of the AMDB subset when it is 
received from the AUS. 
• The TPE shall respond to AUS monitoring mechanisms. 
c. Application Management Server Requirements 
• The AMS shall remove a user from its User Database cache after 
an administratively set timeout interval for non-activity (i.e., the 
user has not used the AMS within the timeout interval).  The 
timeout interval shall be reset to the maximum value whenever the 
AMS services the user.  
• The AMS shall respond to the AUS queries of recent TPE activity 
on the AMS within a timeout interval.  
• The AMS shall respond to AUS requests for AMS status. 
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• The AMS shall detect AUS failure through monitoring 
mechanisms.   
• In the event of AUS failure, for each user still present in its local 
User Database cache, the AMS shall continue servicing until the 
user has closed the application session or has timed out due to non-
activity. 
d. Administrator Requirements 
• The administrator shall configure the monitoring mechanisms on 
the AUS and AMSes.   
• The administrator shall configure the AMS’s user non-activity 
timeout interval. 
• The administrator shall configure the AUS’s timeout interval for 
TPE non-activity. 
• The administrator shall configure the TPE’s user non-activity 
timeout. 
J. SUMMARY 
This chapter described the various components, issues, and mechanisms for 
incorporating single sign-on in MYSEA.  The system architecture, concept of operations, 
assumptions, threats, policies, objectives, and system requirements were discussed.  The 
next chapter focuses on enumerating the security requirements for the Authentication 
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IV. SECURITY REQUIREMENTS 
A. INTRODUCTION  
This chapter consists of the initial set of security requirements for the 
Authentication Server in the MYSEA single sign-on system.  These requirements are 
based on the threats, assumptions, policies, and objectives from the previous chapter.  
The methodology for generating requirements used in this project is based on the 
Common Criteria (CC) v2.2 [13], the Consistency Instruction Manual (CIM) for Medium 
Robustness Environments [15], and a CC-based requirements derivation framework for 
informally defined systems [16].  It is standard practice to list applicable requirements 
verbatim from these sources to ensure completeness and consistency of the requirements.  
Some requirements have been modified and augmented to reflect the requirements for 
this work. 
The requirements are divided into two categories: security functional 
requirements and security requirements.  Following the requirements is a mapping of 
security threats, policies, and assumptions to the objectives.  The objectives are then 
mapped to the security requirements.   
B. AUTHENTICATION SERVER SECURITY FUNCTIONAL 
REQUIREMENTS 
1. Authentication Server Audit 
1.1 The Authentication Server (AUS) shall have configurable auditing 
capabilities.  The levels of auditing are hierarchical, from the least amount of audit 
information to the most.  The Authentication Server will support the following audit 
levels (from high to low):  alert, critical, error, warning, notice, information, and 
debugging.  All audited events shall be recorded. 
1.2 The types of events that shall be audited include user authentication, 
Application Management Server (AMS) retrieval of user authentication information, 
transfer of an Application Mapping Database to a remote device, user session level 
change/logout, failure in a remote component, and reading/modification of the audit trail.  
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1.3 The date and time of the event, IP address of the remote host, type of 
event, user name (if applicable), user session level (if applicable), and the event outcome 
(success or failure) shall be recorded. 
1.4 The AUS shall alarm the Security Administrator whenever a security 
violation has been violated through a message displayed on the local console identifying 
the violation and allow access to the audit records associated with the event. 
1.5 The AUS shall display an acknowledgement message identifying a 
reference to the potential security violation, a notice that it has been acknowledged, the 
time of the acknowledgement and the user identifier that acknowledged the alarm, at the 
local console. 
1.6 Authorized administrators shall be the only entities able to review, delete, 
or modify the audit logs.  Authorized administrators shall be able to configure the actions 
to take when an audit log is full. 
1.7. The audit records generated by the AUS shall be in a format that can be 
parsed. 
2. Authentication Server Communication 
2.1 The AUS shall employ cryptographic functionality for secure connection 
between the AUS and remote IT entities (i.e., TPEs and AMSes). 
3. Authentication Server Cryptography 
3.1 The AUS shall use NIST-validated cryptographic standards when using 
cryptography for communications to remote IT entities. 
3.2 The cryptographic keys used by the AUS shall be managed using NIST-
validated mechanisms.  This includes the generation and destruction of cryptographic 
keys. 
3.3 The AUS shall use NIST-validated cryptomodules in a NIST-validated 
mode for cryptographic operations. 
4. Authentication Server Data Protection 
4.1 For all user accesses to AUS resources, the AUS shall enforce the access 
control policy and information flow policy based on the user ID and session level. 
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4.2 For all remote device accesses to AUS resources, the AUS shall enforce 
the access control policy and information flow policy based on the remote device ID (i.e., 
TPE ID, AMS ID) and security level. 
4.3 The AUS shall ensure that any previous information content of a resource 
is made unavailable upon the resource’s reallocation to any AUS objects. 
5. Authentication Server Identification and Authentication 
5.1 The AUS shall ensure that users are identified and authenticated in order 
to associate them with the proper security attributes, such as user name and session level, 
prior to access to AUS data or network applications. 
5.2 The AUS shall authenticate registered users based on the user ID and a 
password. 
5.3 The AUS shall ensure that Application Management Servers are identified 
and authenticated prior to access to AUS data. 
5.4 The AUS shall authenticate registered Application Management Servers 
based on a digital certificate. 
5.5 The AUS shall associate the following user security attributes with 
subjects acting on the behalf of that user: username, session level, and any other 
appropriate security attributes.   
5.6 The AUS shall associate the following security attributes with subjects 
acting on the behalf of the remote component: hostname, host IP address, and any other 
appropriate security attributes.   
5.7 The AUS shall detect when an administrator-configurable number of 
unsuccessful authentication attempts occur within an administrator-configurable time 
period. 
6. Authentication Server Protection 
6.1 The Authentication Server shall maintain a security domain for its own 
execution that protects it from interference and tampering by untrusted subjects. 
6.2 The Authentication Server shall enforce separation between the security 
domains of subjects in the AUS scope of control. 
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6.3 The AUS shall ensure the availability of user session information provided 
to a remote component within a security administrator-configurable time given the 
remote component has been authenticated to the AUS and is functioning normally. 
6.4 The Authentication Server shall detect replay of authentication 
information, other AUS data, or AUS security attributes transmitted during the course of 
legitimate use. 
6.5 The AUS shall be able to provide reliable time stamps for its own use. 
6.6 When automated recovery from failures/service discontinuities is not 
possible, the AUS shall enter a maintenance mode where the ability to return to a secure 
state is provided. 
6.7 The AUS shall run a suite of self-tests during initial start-up, periodically 
during normal operation as specified by an authorized administrator, and at the request of 
an authorized administrator to demonstrate the correct operation of the software portions 
of the AUS. 
6.8 The AUS shall ensure that security policy enforcement functions are 
invoked and succeed before each function within the AUS scope of control is allowed to 
proceed. 
7. Authentication Server Resource Management 
7.1 The AUS shall enforce administrator-specified maximum quotas of the 
AUS services (i.e., authentication, access to AUS databases) that users and remote 
entities can use over an administrator-specified period of time. 
8. Authentication Server Security Management 
8.1 The AUS shall restrict configuration of security services management, 
such as setting quota limits and audit configuration, only to authorized administrators. 
8.2 The AUS shall maintain the roles: Security Administrator; Cryptographic 
Administrator (i.e., users authorized to perform cryptographic initialization and 
management functions); and Audit Administrator. 
8.3 The AUS shall be able to associate users with roles. 
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9. Authentication Server Access 
9.1 Before establishing a user session that requires authentication, the AUS 
shall display only an authorized administrator-specified advisory notice and consent 
warning message regarding unauthorized use of the AUS. 
9.2 The AUS shall be able to deny session establishment based on the TPE ID, 
user ID, and user clearance. 
9.3 The AUS shall provide AUS-initiated session locking after an 
administratively-set timeout interval. 
10. Authentication Server Trusted Path/Channels 
10.1 The AUS shall provide a communication channel between itself and 
remote components that is logically distinct from other communication channels and 
provides assured identification of its end points and protection of the channel data from 
modification or disclosure. 
10.2 The AUS shall permit itself or an authorized remote component to initiate 
communication via the trusted channel for remote user/component authentication, SSO 
service management, and other network security management functions. 
10.3 The AUS shall provide a communication path between itself and users that 
is logically distinct from other communication paths and provides assured identification 
of its end points and protection of the communicated data from modification or 
disclosure. 
10.4 The AUS shall permit local users to initiate communication via the trusted 
path for initial user authentication and session negotiation. 
11. Authentication Server Single Sign-on Management 
11.1 The AUS shall maintain a user database containing information about 
currently authenticated users (e.g., user ID, session level, TPE ID, etc). 
11.2 The AUS shall distribute information in the user database to authorized, 
authenticated remote entities (i.e., AMSes) when user authentication information is 
requested by the remote entity and when a user’s session status changes (e.g., user logout 
or session level change). 
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11.3 The AUS shall maintain an Application Mapping Database that maps 
applications to hosting Application Management Servers. 
11.4 The AUS shall distribute portions of the Application Mapping Database to 
authorized remote entities (i.e., TPEs) after successful user authentication, successful user 
session negotiation, and upon SAK press during a user’s session when the AMDB subset 
on the TPE is inconsistent with the AUS’s AMDB. 
11.5. The AUS shall be able to provide single sign-on services whether it acts 
alone or with multiple AUSes.   
11.6.  The AUS shall be able to securely distribute single sign-on management 
information (e.g., user database, Application Mapping Database) to other authorized 
AUSes. 
C. AUTHENTICATION SERVER SECURITY ASSURANCE 
REQUIREMENTS 
The security assurance requirements for the existing MYSEA Server were 
developed according to current MYSEA practices.  The following assurance 
requirements for the Authentication Server are based on those found in [16], which 
specified the design of an informally defined system, the Common Criteria assurance 
requirements, and those found in CIM. 
1. Authentication Server Configuration Management 
1.1 The software and documentation (e.g., design specifications, guidance 
documents) for the Authentication Server, including configuration files, shall be placed 
under configuration management (CM). 
1.2 The CM system will uniquely identify configuration items, including those 
associated with the AUS (i.e., Authentication Server implementation and documentation). 
1.3 The CM documentation shall include a configuration list, a CM plan, and 
an acceptance plan.  The CM documentation shall provide evidence that the CM is 
maintaining the configuration items. 
1.4. The acceptance plan shall describe the acceptance procedures for modified 
or newly created configuration items of the AUS. 
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2. Authentication Server Operation 
2.1 The installation, generation and start-up documentation shall be provided 
and shall describe all the steps necessary for secure installation, generation and start-up of 
the AUS. 
3. Authentication Server Development 
3.1 An informal functional specification describing the interfaces of the 
security functions for the Authentication Server shall be provided.  
3.2 An informal high-level design of the AUS shall be developed.  
3.3 An informal architectural design of the AUS security functions shall be 
developed in detail sufficient to determine that the security enforcing mechanisms cannot 
be bypassed. 
3.4 An informal low level design shall be developed for the AUS. 
3.5 The design of the AUS shall meet the functional requirements. 
3.6. The implementation of the AUS shall be an accurate instantiation of the 
design. 
3.7 The implementation of the AUS shall be adequately and accurately 
documented such that the AUS can be generated without further design decisions. 
3.8 An informal security policy model of the AUS shall be developed. 
4 Authentication Server Guidance Documents 
4.1 The user guidance shall describe the interaction between the user and the 
Authentication Server for proper authentication, session level modification, and logout. 
4.2 The user guidance shall clearly present all user responsibilities necessary 
for secure use of the Authentication Server.  
4.3 The administrative guidance shall describe the procedures and technical 
measures necessary to restrict physical access to the system. 
4.4 The administrative guidance shall cover configuration, maintenance, and 
administration of the Authentication Server in a secure manner. The guidance is intended 
to help administrators understand the security functions of the Authentication Server, 
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including both those functions that require the administrator to perform security-critical 
actions and those functions that provide security-critical information to the administrator  
4.5 The administrative guidance shall describe the functions and interfaces 
available to the administrator in addition to how to manage the AUS in a secure manner. 
4.6 The administrative guidance shall describe all security requirements for 
the operational environment that are relevant to the administrator and the AUS. 
5 Authentication Server Life Cycle Support 
5.1 The AUS shall follow the same life cycle model and developmental 
procedures as the MYSEA project. 
6 Authentication Server Test Coverage 
6.1 The AUS and its security functions shall be tested to ensure that it 
operates in accordance with its high-level design and low-level design.   
6.2 Test documentation (e.g., test plan, procedures, and results) shall be 
produced. 
7 Authentication Server Vulnerability Assessment 
7.1 Guidance documentation for the Authentication Server shall be complete, 
clear, consistent, and reasonable.  The guidance documentation shall: identify all possible 
modes of operation of the AUS (including operation following failure or operational 
error), their consequences and implications for maintaining secure operation; list all 
assumptions about the intended environment; list all requirements for external security 
measures (including external procedural, physical and personnel controls); and 
demonstrate that the guidance documentation is complete. 
7.2 The developer shall perform a vulnerability analysis and provide 
vulnerability analysis documentation.   
D. THREAT AND POLICY MAPPING 
The following table shows how the objectives are mapped to the threats, and a 
rationale for the mapping is given.  This is followed by table for the mapping of 
objectives to the policies.   
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The terms TOE and TSF refer to the Authentication Server.  These two terms are 
appear in the table below because the CIM was used as a basis for creating the mapping 
rationale, and it is customary to directly incorporate CIM material. 











secure delivery and 
management of the 
TOE. 
O.ROBUST_ADMIN_GUIDANCE 
helps to mitigate this threat by ensuring 
the TOE administrators have guidance 
that instructs them how to administer the 
TOE in a secure manner and to provide 
the administrator with instructions to 
ensure the TOE was not corrupted 
during the delivery process. Having this 
guidance helps to reduce the mistakes 
that an administrator might make that 
could cause the TOE to be configured in 
a way that is insecure. 
O.ADMIN_ROLE 
 
The TOE will provide 
administrator roles to 
isolate administrative 




O.ADMIN_ROLE plays a role in 
mitigating this threat by limiting the 
functions an administrator can perform 





install or configure 







The TOE will 
provide all the 
functions and 
facilities necessary to 
support the 
administrators in their 
management of the 
security of the TOE, 




O.MANAGE also contributes to 
mitigating this threat by providing 
administrators the capability to view 
configuration settings. For example, if 
the Security Administrator made a 
mistake when configuring the rule-set, 
providing them the capability to view 
the rules affords them the ability to 
review the rules and discover any 








The TOE will 
provide administrator 
roles to isolate 
O.ADMIN_ROLE mitigates this threat 
by restricting the functions available to 
an administrator. This is somewhat 
different than the part this objective 
plays in countering T.ADMIN_ERROR, 
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resulting in user or 
TSF data being 
compromised. 
administrative 




in that this presumes that separate 
individuals will be assigned separate 
roles.  For example, the Audit 
Administrator may detect malicious 




The TOE will 
provide the capability 
to protect audit 
information by 
controlling access to 
the audit trail. 
O.AUDIT_PROTECTION contributes 
to mitigating this threat by controlling 
access to the audit trail. The auditor and 
any trusted IT entities performing IDS-
like functions are the only ones allowed 
to read the audit trail. No one is allowed 
to modify audit records, and the Auditor 
is the only one allowed to delete audit 
records in the audit trail. The TOE has 
the capability to prevent auditable 
actions from occurring if the audit trail 
is full, and of notifying an administrator 
if the audit trail is approaching its 
capacity. In addition, the TOE has the 
capability to restore audit data corrupted 




The TOE will ensure 
that any information 
contained in a 
protected resource is 




prevents a user not authorized to read 
the audit trail from access to audit 
information that might otherwise be 
persistent in a TOE resource (e.g., 
memory). By ensuring the TOE prevents 
residual information in a resource, audit 
information will not become available to 
any user or process except those 




A malicious user or 
process may view 
audit records, cause 
audit records to be 
lost or modified, or 
prevent future audit 
records from being 
recorded, thus 





The TSF will 
maintain a domain 
for its own execution 
that protects itself 






O.SELF_PROTECTION contributes to 
countering this threat by ensuring that 
the TSF can protect itself from users. If 
the TSF could not maintain and control 
its domain of execution, it could not be 
trusted to control access to the resources 
under its control, which includes the 
audit trail. Likewise, ensuring that the 
functions that protect the audit trail are 
always invoked is also critical to the 





O.MAINT_MODE mitigates this threat 
by providing a mode to recover from 
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The TOE will 
provide a mode from 
which recovery or 
initial startup 
procedures can be 
performed. 
malicious modifications/deletions of 









secure delivery and 
management of the 
TOE. 
O.ROBUST_ADMIN_GUIDANCE is 
necessary to mitigate this threat by 
providing administrators the information 
for managing the TOE configuration 
data to protect against malicious actions 
by other entities. 
 
 
A malicious process, 
user, or external IT 
entity may cause 
configuration data or 
other TSF data to be 




The TOE will 
provide all the 
functions and 
facilities necessary to 
support the 
administrators in their 
management of the 
security of the TOE, 




O.MANAGE addresses this threat by 
restricting the abilities to alter the 
configuration data or other TSF data to 




The TOE will ensure 
that any information 
contained in a 
protected resource is 




necessary to mitigate this threat by 
ensuring no TSF data remain in 
resources allocated to a user. Even if the 
security mechanisms do not allow a user 
to explicitly view TSF data, if TSF data 
were to inappropriately reside in a 
resource that was made available to a 
user, that user would be able to 




A malicious user or 
process may cause 
keys, data or 
executable code 
associated with the 
cryptographic 









The TSF will 
maintain a domain 
O.SELF_PROTECTION contributes to 
countering this threat by ensuring that 
the TSF can protect itself from users. If 
the TSF could not maintain and control 
its domain of execution, it could not be 
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cryptographic 
mechanisms and the 
data protected by 
those mechanisms. 
for its own execution 
that protects itself 






trusted to control access to the resources 
under its control, which includes the 
cryptographic data and executable code. 
T.EAVESDROP 
 
A malicious user or 
process may observe 
or modify user or 
TSF data transmitted 
between the TOE 




The TSF will protect 
user and TSF data 
when it is in transit 
from the TOE to 
another remote entity.
O.PROTECT_IN_TRANSIT ensures 
that both user and TSF data are 
protected in transit for modification and 






The TOE will 
provide mechanisms 
that control a user’s 
logical access to the 
TOE and to explicitly 
deny access to 
specific users when 
appropriate. 
O. ROBUST_TOE_ACCESS mitigates 
this threat by controlling the logical 
access to the TOE and its resources. By 
constraining how and when authorized 
users can access the TOE, and by 
mandating the type and strength of the 
authentication mechanisms, this 
objective helps mitigate the possibility 
of a user attempting to login and 
masquerade as an authorized user. In 
addition, this objective provides the 
administrator the means to control the 
number of failed login attempts a user 
can generate before an account is locked 
out, further reducing the possibility of a 
user gaining unauthorized access to the 
TOE. This objective also allows the 
TOE to correctly interpret information 
used during the authentication process 
so that it can make the correct decisions 




A malicious user, 
process, or external 
IT entity may 
masquerade as an 
authorized entity in 
order to gain 
unauthorized access 





The TOE will 
provide a means to 
establish protected 
communications with 
remote entities based 
O.TRUSTED_CHANNEL mitigates by 
controlling how the TOE communicates 
with remote entities.  Communication 
with remote entities is allowed after they 
have been identified and authenticated 
by the TOE.  
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on the security 
attributes of the 





Remote authorized IT 
entities must provide 
a means to 
communicate 
securely with the 
TOE. 
OE.PROTECTED_COMMUNICATIO
NS_CHANNEL mitigates this threat by 
requiring remote entities to 
communicate with the TOE only 
through secure means. This protects the 
TOE from unauthorized access to TOE 
data and resources by requiring the 
remote entities to authenticate to the 






The configuration of, 
and all changes to, 
the TOE and its 
development 
evidence will be 
analyzed, tracked, 
and controlled 
throughout the TOE’s 
development. 
O.CHANGE_MANAGEMENT plays a 
role in countering this threat by 
requiring the developer to provide 
control of the changes made to the 
TOE’s design. This includes controlling 
physical access to the TOE’s 
development area, and having an 
automated configuration management 
system that ensures changes made to the 
TOE go through an approval process 
and only those persons that are 
authorized can make changes to the 
TOE’s design and its documentation. 
O.SOUND_DESIGN 
 
The TOE will be 
designed using sound 
design principles and 
techniques. The TOE 
design, design 
principles, and design 




O.SOUND_DESIGN counters this 
threat, to a degree, by requiring that the 
TOE be developed using sound 
engineering principles. By accurately 
and completely documenting the design 
of the security mechanisms in the TOE, 
including a security model, the design of 
the TOE can be better understood, 
which increases the chances that design 




intentional errors in 
requirements 
specification or 
design of the TOE 
may occur, leading 
to flaws that may be 
exploited by a 










ST ensures that the design of the TOE is 
independently analyzed for design 
flaws. Having an independent party 
perform the assessment ensures an 
objective approach is taken and may 




testing to demonstrate 
the design and 
implementation of the 
TOE does not allow 
attackers with 
medium attack 
potential to violate 
the TOE’s security 
policies. 
left undiscovered by developers that 
have a preconceived incorrect 




The configuration of, 
and all changes to, 
the TOE and its 
development 
evidence will be 
analyzed, tracked, 
and controlled 
throughout the TOE’s 
development. 
O.CHANGE_MANAGEMENT plays a 
role in mitigating this threat in the same 
way that the poor design threat is 
mitigated. By controlling who has 
access to the TOE’s implementation 
representation and ensuring that changes 
to the implementation are analyzed and 
made in a controlled manner, the threat 
of intentional or unintentional errors 
being introduced into the 





of the TOE will be an 
accurate instantiation 




In addition to documenting the design so 
that implementers have a thorough 
understanding of the design, 
O.SOUND_IMPLEMENTATION 
requires that the developer’s tools and 
techniques for implementing the design 
are documented. Having accurate and 
complete documentation, and having the 
appropriate tools and procedures in the 
development process helps reduce the 
likelihood of unintentional errors being 





intentional errors in 
implementation of 
the TOE design may 
occur, leading to 
flaws that may be 
exploited by a 










demonstrates the TSF 
satisfies the security 
functional 
Although the previous three objectives 
help minimize the introduction of errors 
into the implementation, 
O.THOROUGH_FUNCTIONAL_TES
TING increases the likelihood that any 
errors that do exist in the 
implementation (with respect to the 
functional specification, high level, and 













testing to demonstrate 
the design and 
implementation of the 
TOE does not allow 
attackers with 
medium attack 
potential to violate 
the TOE’s security 
policies. 
O.VULNERABILITY_ANALYSIS_TE
ST helps reduce errors in the 
implementation that may not be 
discovered during functional testing. 
Ambiguous design documentation, and 
the fact that exhaustive testing of the 
external interfaces is not required, may 
leave bugs in the implementation 
undiscovered in functional testing. 
Having an independent party perform a 
vulnerability analysis and conduct 
testing outside the scope of functional 





The TOE will 
provide a capability 
to test the TSF to 
ensure the correct 
operation of the TSF 
in its operational 
environment. 
While these testing activities are 
necessary for successful completion of 
an evaluation, this testing activity does 
not address the concern that the TOE 
continues to operate correctly and 
enforce its security policies once it has 
been fielded. Some level of testing must 
be available to end users to ensure the 
TOE’s security mechanisms continue to 
operate correctly once the TOE is 
fielded. O.CORRECT_ 
TSF_OPERATION ensures that once 
the TOE is installed at a customer’s 
location, the capability exists that the 
integrity of the TSF (hardware and 
software, including the cryptographic 
functions) can be demonstrated, and 
thus providing end users the confidence 
that the TOE’s security policies 
continue to be enforced. 
T.POOR_TEST 
 
Lack of or 
insufficient tests to 




in a fielded TOE) 











The TOE will 
undergo appropriate 
Design analysis determines that TOE’s 
documented design satisfies the security 
functional requirements. In order to 
ensure the TOE’s design is correctly 
realized in its implementation, the 




demonstrates the TSF 
satisfies the security 
functional 
requirements. 
the TOE’s security mechanisms must be 
performed during the evaluation of the 
TOE.  
O.THOROUGH_FUNCTIONAL_ 
TESTING ensures that adequate 
functional testing is performed to 
demonstrate the TSF satisfies the 
security functional requirements and 
that the TOE’s security mechanisms 
operate as documented. While 
functional testing serves an important 
purpose, it does not ensure the TSFI 
cannot be used in unintended ways to 










testing to demonstrate 
the design and 
implementation of the 
TOE does not allow 
attackers with 
medium attack 
potential to violate 
the TOE’s security 
policies. 
O.VULNERABILITY_ANALYSIS_TE
ST addresses this concern by requiring a 
vulnerability analysis be performed in 
conjunction with testing that goes 
beyond functional testing. This 
objective provides a measure of 
confidence that the TOE does not 
contain security flaws that may not be 
identified through functional testing. 
T.REPLAY 
 
A user may gain 
inappropriate access 
to the TOE by 
replaying 
authentication 
information, or may 
cause the TOE to be 
inappropriately 
configured by 
replaying TSF data 
or security attributes 




The TOE will 
provide a means to 
detect and reject the 
replay of 
authentication data as 
well as other TSF 
data and security 
attributes. 
O.REPLAY_DETECTION detects a 
user from replaying authentication data. 
Detection of replay of authentication 
data will counter the threat that a user 
will be able to record an authentication 
session between a trusted entity 
(administrative user or trusted IT entity) 
and then replay it to gain access to the 
TOE, as well as counter the ability of a 
user to act as another user. 
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transmitted during 





A user or process 
may gain 
unauthorized access 
to data through 
reallocation of TOE 
resources from one 





The TOE will ensure 
that any information 
contained in a 
protected resource is 





counters this threat by ensuring that TSF 
data and user data is not persistent when 
resources are released by one 
user/process and allocated to another 
user/process. This means that network 
packets sent in response to a request will 
not have residual data from another 
packet (potentially from another user) 




A malicious process 
or user may block 
others from system 
or network resources 
(e.g., network 
applications) via a 
resource exhaustion 





The TOE will 
provide mechanisms 
that mitigate attempts 
to exhaust CPU 
resources provided by 





this threat by requiring the TOE to 
provide controls relating to two different 
resources: CPU time and available 
network connections. The administrator 
is allowed to specify a percentage of 
processor time that is allowed to be used 
so that an attempt to exhaust the 
resource will fail when it reaches the 
quota. This objective also addresses the 
denial-of-service attack of a user 
attempting to exhaust the connection-
oriented resources by generating a large 




A malicious user, 
process, or external 
IT entity may 
misrepresent itself as 





The TOE will 
provide a means to 
ensure that users are 
not communicating 
with some other 
entity pretending to 




It is possible for an entity other than the 
TOE (a subject on the TOE, or another 
IT entity on the network between the 
TOE and the end user) to provide an 
environment that may lead a user to 
mistakenly believe they are interacting 
with the TOE, thereby fooling the user 
into divulging identification and 
authentication information.  
O.TRUSTED_PATH mitigates this 
threat by ensuring users have the 
capability to ensure they are 
communicating with the TOE when 
providing identification and 





The TOE will 
provide a means to 
establish protected 
communications with 
remote entities based 
on the security 
attributes of the 
remote entity. 
O.TRUSTED_CHANNEL mitigates 
this threat similar to 
O_TRUSTED_PATH by providing 
remote components the capability to 
ensure they are communicating with the 
TOE when providing identification and 





Remote authorized IT 
entities must provide 
a means to 
communicate 
securely with the 
TOE. 
OE.PROTECTED_COMMUNICATIO
NS_CHANNEL is necessary to mitigate 
this threat because the trusted channel 
requires a protected communications 
channel to provide authenticity of the 





The TOE will ensure 
that any information 
contained in a 
protected resource is 




necessary to mitigate this threat by 
ensuring no TSF data remain in 
resources allocated to a user. Even if the 
security mechanisms do not allow a user 
to explicitly view TSF data, if TSF data 
were to inappropriately reside in a 
resource that was made available to a 
user, that user would be able to 




The TSF will 
maintain a domain 
for its own execution 
that protects itself 






O.SELF_PROTECTION requires that 
the TSF be able to protect itself from 
tampering and that the security 
mechanisms in the TSF cannot be 
bypassed. Without this objective, there 
could be no assurance that users could 





A malicious user or 
process may cause 
TSF data or 







O.MANAGE provides the capability to 
restrict access to TSF to those that are 
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The TOE will 
provide all the 
functions and 
facilities necessary to 
support the 
administrators in their 
management of the 
security of the TOE, 




authorized to use the functions. 
Satisfaction of this objective (and its 
associated requirements) prevents 
unauthorized access to TSF functions 





The TOE will display 
an advisory warning 
regarding use of the 
TOE. 
O.DISPLAY_BANNER helps mitigate 
this threat by providing the Platform 
Administrator the ability to remove 
product information (e.g., product name, 
version number) from a banner that is 
displayed to users. Having product 
information about the TOE provides an 
attacker with information that may 




The TOE will 
provide a means to 
ensure that users are 
not communicating 
with some other 
entity pretending to 




O.TRUSTED_PATH plays a role in 
addressing this threat by ensuring that 
there is a trusted communication path 
between the TSF and various users 
(relying parties (for authentication) and 
trusted IT entities (for performing 
replication, for instance)). This ensures 
the transmitted data cannot be 
compromised or disclosed during the 
duration of the trusted path. The 
protection offered by this objective is 
limited to TSF data, including 
authentication data and all data sent or 
received by trusted IT entities (a relying 
party’s user data is not protected; only 





The TOE will 




mitigate the threat of TSF compromise 
by malicious remote entities by 
requiring the TOE to identify and 
authenticate remote entities before 
communicating with them. 
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remote entities based 
on the security 






Remote authorized IT 
entities must provide 
a means to 
communicate 
securely with the 
TOE. 
OE.PROTECTED_COMMUNICATIO
NS_CHANNEL is necessary to mitigate 
this threat because it provides 
confidentiality, integrity, and 
authenticity of communications between 
remote entities and the TOE, thereby 




Physical security will 
be provided within 
the domain for the 
value of the IT assets 
protected by the 
operating system and 
the value of the 
stored, processed, and 
transmitted 
information. 
OE.PHYSICAL helps mitigate this 
threat by controlling physical access to 
the TOE and the TSF, decreasing the 





A user may gain 
unauthorized access 





The TOE will 
provide mechanisms 
that control a user’s 
logical access to the 
TOE and to explicitly 
deny access to 
specific users when 
appropriate. 
O. ROBUST_TOE_ACCESS helps to 
mitigate this threat by including 
mechanisms that place controls on 
user’s sessions. Local administrator’s 
sessions and remote sessions are locked 
after an administrator-defined time 
period of inactivity. Locking the local 
administrator’s session reduces the 
opportunity of someone gaining 
unauthorized access the session when 
the console is unattended. Dropping the 
connection of a remote session (after the 
specified time period) reduces the risk 
of someone accessing the remote 
machine where the session was 
established, thus gaining unauthorized 





O.MEDIATE works to mitigate this 
threat by requiring that TOE data is 
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The TOE must 
protect user data in 
accordance with its 
security policy. 
protected using access control items. An 
access control item contains information 
about who is allowed to access an 
object, as well as the allowed modes of 
access. The settings present in the 
access control item selected in the 
access control decision process 
determine whether or not a user is 
authorized to access the object. It should 
be noted that multiple security policies 
can be (but do not have to be) in place in 
a single TOE, meaning that the process 
by which the target ACI is selected can 
be different for two different objects. It 
is required, however, that all objects be 
covered by this policy. Note that 
O.SELF_PROTECTION ensures that 
this access control mechanism is always 
invoked, thus ensuring that users cannot 
bypass the mechanism to access data for 
which they are not authorized. 
 
A user may gain 
access to user data 
for which they are 
not authorized 
according to the 




The TOE will 
provide users with 
the information 
necessary to correctly 
use the security 
mechanisms. 
O.USER_GUIDANCE mitigates this 
threat by providing the user the 
information necessary to use the 
security mechanisms that control access 










ability to identify 
and take action 




The TOE will 
provide the capability 
to selectively view 
audit information, 




O.AUDIT_REVIEW helps to mitigate 
this threat by providing a variety of 
mechanisms for monitoring the use of 
the system. The audit review is 
performed through analysis of the audit 
trail produced by the audit mechanism. 
 
For analyzing the audit trail, the TOE 
requires an Auditor role. This role is 
restricted to Audit record review and the 
deletion of the audit trail for 
maintenance purposes.  
 
The TOE’s audit analysis mechanism 
must consist of a minimum set of 
configurable audit events that could 
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indicate a potential security violation. 
Thresholds for these events must be 
configurable by an appropriate 
administrative role.  
By configuring these auditable events, 
the TOE monitors the occurrences of 
these events (e.g. set number of 
authentication failures, self-test failures, 
etc.) and immediately notifies an 
administrator once an event has 
occurred or a set threshold has been met.
 
If a potential security violation has been 
detected, the TOE displays a message 
that identifies the potential security 
violation to the administrative console. 
This message is displayed and will 
remain on the screen until an 
administrator acknowledges the 
message. At this point, the administrator 
will receive notification that the alarm 
has been acknowledged, who 
acknowledged the alarm, and the time 
that it was acknowledged. 
 
In addition to displaying the potential 
security violation, the message must 
contain all audit records that generated 
the potential security violation. By 
enforcing the message content and 
display, this objective provides 
assurance that a TOE administrator will 




The TOE will 
provide a mode from 
which recovery or 
initial startup 
procedures can be 
performed. 
O.MAINT_MODE helps to mitigate this 
threat by ensuring that the TOE does not 
continue to operate in an insecure state 
when a hardware or software failure 
occurs. After a failure, the TOE enters a 
state that disallows operations and 
requires an administrator to follow 
documented procedures to return the 




When the TOE is 
initially started or 
restarted after a 
failure, the security 
state of the TOE 





counters this threat by ensuring that the 
TSF runs a suite of tests to successfully 
63
The TOE will 
provide a capability 
to test the TSF to 
ensure the correct 
operation of the TSF 
in its operational 
environment. 
demonstrate the correct operation of the 
TSF (hardware and software) and the 
TSF’s cryptographic components at 
initial startup of the TOE. In addition to 
ensuring that the TOE’s security state 
can be verified, an administrator can 
verify the integrity of the TSF’s data 
and stored code as well as the TSF’s 
cryptographic data and stored code 




The TOE will be 
designed using sound 
design principles, and 
techniques. The TOE 
design, design 
principles and design 




O.SOUND_DESIGN works to mitigate 
this threat by requiring that the TOE 
developers provide accurate and 
complete design documentation of the 
security mechanisms in the TOE, 
including a security model. By 
providing this documentation, the 
possible secure states of the TOE are 
described, thus enabling the 
administrator to return the TOE to one 










secure delivery and 
management of the 
TOE. 
O. ROBUST_ADMIN_GUIDANCE 
provides administrative guidance for the 
secure start-up of the TOE as well as 
guidance to configure and administer 
the TOE securely. This guidance 
provides administrators with the 
information necessary to ensure that the 
TOE is started and initialized in a secure 
manor. The guidance also provides 
information about the corrective 
measure necessary when a failure occurs 
(i.e., how to bring the TOE back into a 
secure state). 
Table 8. Threat to Objective Mapping 
The following table shows what objectives address a particular policy and how 
the objectives apply to the policy. 





The TOE shall display 
an initial banner 
O.DISPLAY_BANNER 
 
The TOE will display an 
advisory warning regarding 
O.DISPLAY_BANNER 
satisfies this policy by 
ensuring that the TOE 
displays an 
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describing restrictions of 
use, legal agreements, or 
any other appropriate 
information to which 
users consent by 
accessing the TOE. 
use of the TOE. Administrator-configurable 
banner that provides all users 
with a warning about the 
unauthorized use of the TOE. 
This is required to be 
displayed before an interactive 
administrative session, since it 
does not make sense to 
display a banner for sessions 
involving authentication 
requests from users, and those 




The TOE will provide the 
capability to detect and 
create records of security-
relevant events associated 
with users. 
O.AUDIT_GENERATION 
addresses this policy by 
providing an audit mechanism 
to record the actions of a 
specific user, as well as the 
capability for an administrator 
to “pre-select” audit events 
based on the user ID. The 
audit event selection function 
is configurable during run-
time to ensure the TOE is able 
to capture security-relevant 
events given changes in threat 
conditions. Additionally, the 
administrator’s ID is recorded 
when any security relevant 
change is made to the TOE 
(e.g. access rule modification, 
start-stop of the audit 
mechanism, establishment of 
a trusted channel, etc.). 
Attributes used in the audit 
record generation process are 
also required to be bound to 




The authorized users of 
the TOE shall be held 
accountable for their 
actions within the TOE. 
O.TIME_STAMPS 
 
The TOE will provide 
reliable time stamps and the 
capability for the 
administrator to set the time 
used for these time stamps. 
O.TIME_STAMPS plays a 
role in supporting this policy 
by requiring the TOE to 
provide a reliable time stamp 
(configured locally by the 
Administrator or via a trusted 
IT entity, such as an NTP 
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server). The audit mechanism 
is required to include the 
current date and time in each 
audit record. All audit records 
that include the user ID will 
also include the date and time 
that the event occurred. 
O.ROBUST_TOE_ACCESS 
 
The TOE will provide 
mechanisms that control a 
user’s logical access to the 
TOE and to explicitly deny 
access to specific users when 
appropriate. 
O. ROBUST_TOE_ACCESS 
supports this policy by 
requiring the TOE to identify 
and authenticate all authorized 
users prior to allowing any 
TOE access or any TOE 
mediated access on behalf of 
those users.  
O.ADMIN_ROLE 
 
The TOE will provide 
administrator roles to isolate 
administrative actions, and to 
make the administrative 
functions available locally. 
O.ADMIN_ROLE supports 
this policy by requiring the 
TOE to provide mechanisms 
that allow local administration 




Administrators shall be 
able to administer the 
TOE locally only. 
O.TRUSTED_PATH 
 
The TOE will provide a 
means to ensure that users 
are not communicating with 
some other entity pretending 
to be the TOE when 
supplying identification and 
authentication data. 
O.TRUSTED_PATH satisfies 
this policy by requiring that 
each remote administrative 
and management session for 
all trusted users is 
authenticated and conducted 
via a secure channel. 
Additionally, all trusted IT 
entities (e.g., trusted 
Application Management 
Servers, Trusted Path 
Extensions) connect through a 
protected channel, thus 




The TOE shall use NIST 
FIPS validated 
cryptography as a 
baseline with additional 
NSA-approved methods 
for key management 
(i.e.; generation, access, 
O.CRYPTOGRAPHY 
 
The TOE will use NIST 
FIPS 140-2 validated 
cryptographic services. 
O.CRYPTOGRAPHY 
implements this policy by 
requiring the TOE to 
implement NIST FIPS-
validated cryptographic 
services. The objective 
requires that the functions 
needed by the TOE are FIPS 
approved, and further that 
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they are available in a FIPS-
approved mode of operation 
of the cryptomodule. 
distribution, destruction, 
handling, and storage of 




hashing, key exchange, 





The TOE will ensure that 
any information contained in 
a protected resource is not 
released when the resource is 
reallocated. 
O.RESIDUAL_INFORMATI
ON implements this policy by 
ensuring that TSF data and 
user data is not persistent 
when resources are released 
by one user/process and 
allocated to another 
user/process. This means that 
network packets sent in 
response to a request will not 
have residual data from 
another packet (potentially 
from another user) due to the 
padding of a packet. 
O.SINGLE_SIGN_ON 
 
The TOE will provide a 
means to ensure users will be 
able to access services on a 
federation of servers after 
successful authentication. 
O.SINGLE_SIGN_ON 
implements this policy by 
providing the mechanisms to 
establish single sign-on.  This 
includes authenticating the 
user through an authorized 
TPE, maintaining the 
Application Mapping 
Database (AMDB) and 
distributing subsets of the 
AMDBs (that map 
applications to the hosting 
servers) to the appropriate 
TPEs, maintaining the User 
Database (containing 
currently authenticated users), 
and distributing the 
information in the User 




Authorized users shall 
be able to access 
services on a federation 






The TOE will provide either 
centralized or distributed 
user identification and 
authentication mechanisms 
O.SINGLE_SIGN_ON_SUPP
ORT supports this policy by 
requiring the TOE to perform 
the single sign-on 
mechanisms by the TOE itself 
(central SSO) or by 
distributing the functions 
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that are secure. across multiple TOEs (for 
increased performance and 





The TOE shall undergo 
appropriate independent 
vulnerability analysis 
and penetration testing 
to demonstrate that the 
TOE is resistant to an 
attacker possessing a 




The TOE will undergo 
appropriate independent 
vulnerability analysis and 
penetration testing to 
demonstrate the design and 
implementation of the TOE 
does not allow attackers with 
medium attack potential to 
violate the TOE’s security 
policies. 
O.VULNERABILITY_ANA
LYSIS_TEST satisfies this 
policy by ensuring that an 
independent analysis is 
performed on the TOE and 
penetration testing based on 
that analysis is performed. 
Having an independent party 
perform the analysis helps 
ensure objectivity and 
eliminates preconceived 
notions of the TOE’s design 
and implementation that may 
otherwise affect the 
thoroughness of the analysis. 
The level of analysis and 
testing requires that an 
attacker with a moderate 
attack potential cannot 
compromise the TOE’s ability 
to enforce its security policies.
Table 9. Policy to Objective Mapping 
 
E. ASSUMPTION MAPPING 
The following table shows how the objectives of the environment address the 
assumptions. 





It is assumed that the IT 
environment provides the 
TOE with appropriate 
physical security, 
commensurate with the 
value of the IT assets 
protected by the TOE. 
OE.PHYSICAL 
 
Physical security will be 
provided within the domain 
for the value of the IT 
assets protected by the 
operating system and the 
value of the stored, 
processed, and transmitted 
information. 
OE.PHYSICAL addresses 
this assumption by requiring 
that physical security, 
commensurate with the value 
of the TOE and the data it 










addresses this assumption by 
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The accreditation process 
will ensure that the 
procuring organization 
will manage and protect 
the remote components in 
a manner that is 
commensurate with the 
protection mechanisms 
provided by the TOE.  
The accreditation process 
will ensure that the 
procuring organization will 
manage and protect the 
remote components (i.e., 
Application Management 
Servers, Trusted Path 
Extensions) in a manner 
that is commensurate with 
protection provided for the 
TOE. 
requiring sufficient 
documentation and evidence 
from the certification and 
accreditation process that the 
remote components that 
interact with the TOE be 
managed and protected in a 
manner that is commensurate 
with protection provided by 





processes that interact 
with the TOE are trusted 
to comply with the 
security requirements 





Remote component trusted 
processes will be 
constructed to comply with 
the security requirements 




addresses this assumption by 
requiring remote component 
processes to be soundly 
constructed in order to 






All network components 
are vetted with the 
appropriate level of trust 
in order to properly 






The security administrator 
must ensure that the 
appropriate level of trust 
has been established 
among all components 
such that network security 




NT satisfies this assumption 
by requiring the 
administration of all network 
components (i.e., the TOE, 
Application Management 
Servers, and Trusted Path 
Extensions) is properly 
performed such that the 
network security policy can 
be correctly enforced. 
Table 10. Assumption to Environmental Objective Mapping 
 
F. REQUIREMENTS MAPPING 
The objectives for the Authentication Server need to be mapped to requirements 
that will implement these objectives.  As a reminder, the terms TOE and TSF refer to the 
Authentication Server (AUS).  The objectives use the term TOE and TSF; in contrast, the 
requirements use the term AUS because the objectives closely follow Common Criteria 
conventions while the requirements do not (allows for more flexibility in constructing the 
requirements).  The numbers preceding each requirement refers to the section of this 
chapter where the requirement can be found.     
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Objectives to Requirements Mapping 
O.ADMIN_ROLE:  The TOE will provide administrator roles to isolate administrative 
actions, and to make the administrative functions available locally. 
B.8.2 The AUS shall maintain the roles: Security Administrator; Cryptographic 
Administrator (i.e., users authorized to perform cryptographic initialization and 
management functions); and Audit Administrator. 
B.8.3 The AUS shall be able to associate users with roles. 
O.AUDIT_GENERATION:  The TOE will provide the capability to detect and create 
records of security-relevant events associated with users. 
B.1.1 The Authentication Server (AUS) shall have configurable auditing capabilities.  
The levels of auditing are hierarchical, from the least amount of audit information to the 
most.  The Authentication Server will support the following audit levels (from high to 
low):  alert, critical, error, warning, notice, information, and debugging.  All audited 
events shall be recorded. 
B.1.2 The types of events that shall be audited include user authentication, Application 
Management Server (AMS) retrieval of user authentication information, transfer of an 
Application Mapping Database to a remote device, user session level change/logout, 
failure in a remote component, and reading/modification of the audit trail.  
B.1.3 The date and time of the event, IP address of the remote host, type of event, user 
name (if applicable), user session level (if applicable), and the event outcome (success or 
failure) shall be recorded. 
B.1.7. The audit records generated by the AUS shall be in a format that can be parsed. 
B.5.1 The AUS shall ensure that users are identified and authenticated in order to 
associate them with the proper security attributes, such as user name and session level, 
prior to access to AUS data or network applications. 
B.6.5 The AUS shall be able to provide reliable time stamps for its own use. 
O.AUDIT_PROTECTION:  The TOE will provide the capability to protect audit 
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information by controlling access to the audit trail. 
B.1.6 Authorized administrators shall be the only entities able to review, delete, or 
modify the audit logs.  Authorized administrators shall be able to configure the actions to 
take when an audit log is full. 
O.AUDIT_REVIEW:  The TOE will provide the capability to selectively view audit 
information, and alert the administrator of identified potential security violations. 
B.1.4 The AUS shall alarm the Security Administrator whenever a security violation 
has been violated through a message displayed on the local console identifying the 
violation and allow access to the audit records associated with the event. 
B.1.5 The AUS shall display an acknowledgement message identifying a reference to 
the potential security violation, a notice that it has been acknowledged, the time of the 
acknowledgement and the user identifier that acknowledged the alarm, at the local 
console. 
O.CHANGE_MANAGEMENT:  The configuration of, and all changes to, the TOE and 
its development evidence will be analyzed, tracked, and controlled throughout the TOE’s 
development. 
C.1.1 The software and documentation (e.g., design specifications, guidance 
documents) for the Authentication Server, including configuration files, shall be placed 
under configuration management (CM). 
C.1.2 The CM system will uniquely identify configuration items, including those 
associated with the AUS (i.e., Authentication Server implementation and documentation). 
C.1.3 The CM documentation shall include a configuration list, a CM plan, and an 
acceptance plan.  The CM documentation shall provide evidence that the CM is 
maintaining the configuration items. 
C.1.4. The acceptance plan shall describe the acceptance procedures for modified or 
newly created configuration items of the AUS. 
C.5.1 The AUS shall follow the same life cycle model and developmental procedures as 
the MYSEA project. 
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O.CORRECT_ TSF_OPERATION:  The TOE will provide a capability to test the TSF to 
ensure the correct operation of the TSF in its operational environment. 
B.6.7 The AUS shall run a suite of self-tests during initial start-up, periodically during 
normal operation as specified by an authorized administrator, and at the request of an 
authorized administrator to demonstrate the correct operation of the software portions of 
the AUS. 
O.CRYPTOGRAPHY:  The TOE will use NIST FIPS 140-2 validated cryptographic 
services. 
B.3.1 The AUS shall use NIST-validated cryptographic standards when using 
cryptography for communications to remote IT entities. 
B.3.2 The cryptographic keys used by the AUS shall be managed using NIST-validated 
mechanisms.  This includes the generation and destruction of cryptographic keys. 
B.3.3 The AUS shall use NIST-validated cryptomodules in a NIST-validated mode for 
cryptographic operations. 
O.DISPLAY_BANNER:  The TOE will display an advisory warning regarding use of the 
TOE. 
B.9.1 Before establishing a user session that requires authentication, the AUS shall 
display only an authorized administrator-specified advisory notice and consent warning 
message regarding unauthorized use of the AUS. 
O.MAINT_MODE:  The TOE will provide a mode from which recovery or initial startup 
procedures can be performed. 
B.6.6 When automated recovery from failures/service discontinuities is not possible, the 
AUS shall enter a maintenance mode where the ability to return to a secure state is 
provided. 
O.MANAGE:  The TOE will provide all the functions and facilities necessary to support 
the administrators in their management of the security of the TOE, and restrict these 
functions and facilities from unauthorized use. 
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B.8.1 The AUS shall restrict configuration of security services management, such as 
setting quota limits and audit configuration, only to authorized administrators. 
O.MEDIATE:  The TOE must protect user data in accordance with its security policy. 
B.4.1 For all user accesses to AUS resources, the AUS shall enforce the access control 
policy and information flow policy based on the user ID and session level. 
B.4.2 For all remote device accesses to AUS resources, the AUS shall enforce the 
access control policy and information flow policy based on the remote device ID (i.e., 
TPE ID, AMS ID) and security level. 
O.PROTECT_IN_TRANSIT:  The TSF will protect user and TSF data when it is in 
transit from the TOE to another remote entity. 
B.2.1 The AUS shall employ cryptographic functionality for secure connection between 
the AUS and remote IT entities (i.e., TPEs and AMSes). 
O.REPLAY_DETECTION:  The TOE will provide a means to detect and reject the 
replay of authentication data as well as other TSF data and security attributes. 
B.6.4 The Authentication Server shall detect replay of authentication information, other 
AUS data, or AUS security attributes transmitted during the course of legitimate use. 
O.RESIDUAL_INFORMATION:  The TOE will ensure that any information contained 
in a protected resource is not released when the resource is reallocated. 
B.4.3 The AUS shall ensure that any previous information content of a resource is made 
unavailable upon the resource’s reallocation to any AUS objects. 
O.RESOURCE_SHARING:  The TOE will provide mechanisms that mitigate attempts to 
exhaust CPU resources provided by the TOE (e.g., network authentication.). 
B.7.1 The AUS shall enforce administrator-specified maximum quotas of the AUS 
services (i.e., authentication, access to AUS databases) that users and remote entities can 
use over an administrator-specified period of time. 
O. ROBUST_ADMIN_GUIDANCE:  The TOE will provide administrators with the 
necessary information for secure delivery and management of the TOE. 
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C.2.1 The installation, generation and start-up documentation shall be provided and 
shall describe all the steps necessary for secure installation, generation and start-up of the 
AUS. 
C.4.3 The administrative guidance shall describe the procedures and technical measures 
necessary to restrict physical access to the system. 
C.4.4 The administrative guidance shall cover configuration, maintenance, and 
administration of the Authentication Server in a secure manner. The guidance is intended 
to help administrators understand the security functions of the Authentication Server, 
including both those functions that require the administrator to perform security-critical 
actions and those functions that provide security-critical information to the administrator  
C.4.5 The administrative guidance shall describe the functions and interfaces available to 
the administrator in addition to how to manage the AUS in a secure manner. 
C.4.6 The administrative guidance shall describe all security requirements for the 
operational environment that are relevant to the administrator and the AUS. 
C.7.1 Guidance documentation for the Authentication Server shall be complete, clear, 
consistent, and reasonable.  The guidance documentation shall: identify all possible 
modes of operation of the AUS (including operation following failure or operational 
error), their consequences and implications for maintaining secure operation; list all 
assumptions about the intended environment; list all requirements for external security 
measures (including external procedural, physical and personnel controls); and 
demonstrate that the guidance documentation is complete. 
O. ROBUST_TOE_ACCESS:  The TOE will provide mechanisms that control a user’s 
logical access to the TOE and to explicitly deny access to specific users when 
appropriate. 
B.5.1 The AUS shall ensure that users are identified and authenticated in order to 
associate them with the proper security attributes, such as user name and session level, 
prior to access to AUS data or network applications. 
B.5.2 The AUS shall authenticate registered users based on the user ID and a password. 
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B.5.3 The AUS shall ensure that Application Management Servers are identified and 
authenticated prior to access to AUS data. 
B.5.4 The AUS shall authenticate registered Application Management Servers based on 
a digital certificate. 
B.5.5 The AUS shall associate the following user security attributes with subjects acting 
on the behalf of that user: username, session level, and any other appropriate security 
attributes.   
B.5.6 The AUS shall associate the following security attributes with subjects acting on 
the behalf of the remote component: hostname, host IP address, and any other appropriate 
security attributes.   
B.5.7 The AUS shall detect when an administrator-configurable number of unsuccessful 
authentication attempts occur within an administrator-configurable time period. 
B.9.2 The AUS shall be able to deny session establishment based on the TPE ID, user 
ID, and user clearance. 
B.9.3 The AUS shall provide AUS-initiated session locking after an administratively-set 
timeout interval. 
O.SELF_PROTECTION:  The TSF will maintain a domain for its own execution that 
protects itself and its resources from external interference, tampering or unauthorized 
disclosure. 
B.6.1 The Authentication Server shall maintain a security domain for its own execution 
that protects it from interference and tampering by untrusted subjects. 
B.6.2 The Authentication Server shall enforce separation between the security domains 
of subjects in the AUS scope of control. 
B.6.8 The AUS shall ensure that security policy enforcement functions are invoked and 
succeed before each function within the AUS scope of control is allowed to proceed. 
O.SINGLE_SIGN_ON:  The TOE will provide a means to ensure users will be able to 
access services on a federation of servers after successful authentication. 
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B.6.3 The AUS shall ensure the availability of user session information provided to a 
remote component within a security administrator-configurable time given the remote 
component has been authenticated to the AUS and is functioning normally. 
B.11.1 The AUS shall maintain a user database containing information about currently 
authenticated users (e.g., user ID, session level, TPE ID, etc). 
B.11.2 The AUS shall distribute information in the user database to authorized, 
authenticated remote entities (i.e., AMSes) when user authentication information is 
requested by the remote entity and when a user’s session status changes (e.g., user logout 
or session level change). 
B.11.3 The AUS shall maintain an Application Mapping Database that maps applications 
to hosting Application Management Servers. 
B.11.4 The AUS shall distribute portions of the Application Mapping Database to 
authorized remote entities (i.e., TPEs) after successful user authentication, successful user 
session negotiation, and upon SAK press during a user’s session when the AMDB subset 
on the TPE is inconsistent with the AUS’s AMDB. 
O.SINGLE_SIGN_ON_SUPPORT:  The TOE will provide either centralized or 
distributed user identification and authentication mechanisms that are secure. 
B.11.5. The AUS shall be able to provide single sign-on services whether it acts alone or 
with multiple AUSes.   
B.11.6.  The AUS shall be able to securely distribute single sign-on management 
information (e.g., user database, Application Mapping Database) to authorized AUSes. 
O.SOUND_DESIGN:  The TOE will be designed using sound design principles, and 
techniques. The TOE design, design principles and design techniques will be adequately 
and accurately documented. 
C.3.1 An informal functional specification describing the interfaces of the security 
functions for the Authentication Server shall be provided.  
C.3.2 An informal high-level design of the AUS shall be developed.  
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C.3.3 An informal architectural design of the AUS security functions shall be developed 
in detail sufficient to determine that the security enforcing mechanisms cannot be 
bypassed. 
C.3.4 An informal low level design shall be developed for the AUS. 
C.3.5 The design of the AUS shall meet the functional requirements. 
C.3.8 An informal security policy model of the AUS shall be developed. 
O.SOUND_IMPLEMENTATION:  The implementation of the TOE will be an accurate 
instantiation of its design, and is adequately and accurately documented. 
C.3.6. The implementation of the AUS shall be an accurate instantiation of the design. 
C.3.7 The implementation of the AUS shall be adequately and accurately documented 
such that the AUS can be generated without further design decisions. 
O.THOROUGH_FUNCTIONAL_ TESTING 
The TOE will undergo appropriate security functional testing that demonstrates the TSF 
satisfies the security functional requirements. 
C.6.1 The AUS and its security functions shall be tested to ensure that it operates in 
accordance with its high-level design and low-level design.   
C.6.2 Test documentation (e.g., test plan, procedures, and results) shall be produced. 
O.TIME_STAMPS:  The TOE will provide reliable time stamps and the capability for the 
administrator to set the time used for these time stamps. 
B.6.5 The AUS shall be able to provide reliable time stamps for its own use. 
B.8.1 The AUS shall restrict configuration of security services management, such as 
setting quota limits and audit configuration, only to authorized administrators. 
O.TRUSTED_CHANNEL:  The TOE will provide a means to establish protected 
communications with remote entities based on the security attributes of the remote entity. 
B.10.1 The AUS shall provide a communication channel between itself and remote 
components that is logically distinct from other communication channels and provides 
77
assured identification of its end points and protection of the channel data from 
modification or disclosure. 
B.10.2 The AUS shall permit itself or an authorized remote component initiate 
communication via the trusted channel for remote user/component authentication, SSO 
service management, and other network security management functions. 
O.TRUSTED_PATH:  The TOE will provide a means to ensure that users are not 
communicating with some other entity pretending to be the TOE when supplying 
identification and authentication data. 
B.10.3 The AUS shall provide a communication path between itself and local users that 
is logically distinct from other communication paths and provides assured identification 
of its end points and protection of the communicated data from modification or 
disclosure. 
B.10.4 The AUS shall permit local users to initiate communication via the trusted path 
for initial user authentication and session negotiation. 
O.USER_GUIDANCE:  The TOE will provide users with the information necessary to 
correctly use the security mechanisms. 
C.4.1 The user guidance shall describe the interaction between the user and the 
Authentication Server for proper authentication, session level modification, and logout. 
C.4.2 The user guidance shall clearly present all user responsibilities necessary for 
secure use of the Authentication Server.  
O.VULNERABILITY_ANALYSIS_ TEST:  The TOE will undergo appropriate 
independent vulnerability analysis and penetration testing to demonstrate the design and 
implementation of the TOE does not allow attackers with medium attack potential to 
violate the TOE’s security policies. 
C.7.2 The developer shall perform a vulnerability analysis and provide vulnerability 
analysis documentation.   





This chapter described the initial set of functional and assurance security 
requirements for the Authentication Server.  The threats, policies, and assumptions were 
mapped to objectives, both system and environmental.  These objectives were then 
mapped back to the security requirements, transitively demonstrating how the 
requirements address the threats, policies, and assumptions applicable to the 
































V. FUTURE WORK AND CONCLUSIONS 
A. INTRODUCTION 
This chapter presents future work and the conclusions for the MYSEA single 
sign-on project.  This thesis laid out the initial SSO design and requirements; they will 
both be further refined in future iterations of this project.  Some suggestions for future 
work are discussed below.   
B. FUTURE WORK 
1. Additional Requirements 
Because the security requirements in Chapter IV are preliminary in nature, 
continuing work in revising and refining these requirements is needed.  The initial 
security requirements were specified only for the Authentication Server, but the security 
requirements for the environment must also be specified.  This includes the requirements 
for the Protected Communications Channel, Trusted Path Extension, and Application 
Management Server such that single sign-on functionality is supported by these 
components.   
Additional requirements also need to be specified for the Service Management 
mechanisms that support single sign-on, such as the distribution of the Application 
Mapping Database (AMDB) and ensuring its consistency across all the TPEs.  Other 
requirements for Service Management that need to be specified are those that monitor the 
liveliness of the TPEs, AMSes, and the AUS.  The requirements to confirm the AMS is 
hosting the applications as designated in the AMDB also need to be specified. 
This thesis assumed only a single Authentication Server to provide the initial user 
authentication and subsequent single sign-on.  However, the objective specified in 
Chapter III, O.SINGLE_SIGN_ON_SUPPORT allows the AUS to be distributed among 
multiple machines for increased performance and reliability.  Using multiple AUSes for 
distributed authentication and sign-on requires specification of the requirements for 
secure distribution of authentication data among the multiple AUSes, requirements for 
the AUSes to maintain consistency of the authentication data, and load-balancing and 
reliability requirements for the AUSes. 
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The analysis in Chapter III (threats, assumptions, policies and objectives) and the 
requirements in Chapter IV were based on the Common Criteria v.2.2.  However, 
Common Criteria version 3.0 was released late into this thesis so the new standards have 
not been incorporated in this work.  Future work involves integrating Common Criteria 
version 3.0 elements with the current requirements. 
2. Prospective Design Work 
This work presented a very high-level design of the overall SSO system for the 
MYSEA environment in Chapter III.  An initial set of requirements was specified in 
Chapter IV, a complete set of requirement needs to be specified first before work on the 
low level design can proceed.  Some aspects of the SSO system that need to be further 
designed are the mechanisms for the construction of the Application Mapping Databases, 
network and application-level monitoring, failure recovery (especially when an AUS 
fails), and distributed Authentication Server capabilities.   
The Protected Communications Channel (PCC) protocol also needs to be 
designed since all communications between components on the MLS LAN employ the 
PCC and depend on the PCC to provide communications security.  In [5], the high level 
requirements for the PCC protocol were specified, but this work needs to be reassessed to 
determine if the protocol is sufficient to support single sign-on.  If the existing PCC 
protocol does not adequately support SSO, enhancements to the PCC protocol must be 
made to accommodate SSO requirements.    Only then can a low level design of the PCC 
protocol be developed, from which an implementation of the PCC protocol can then be 
constructed.  Other future work may involve moving the AMS-AUS communications to a 
separate LAN that may or may not require the PCC, but a thorough analysis and design is 
required. 
At a more fine-grained level, the various processes on the AUS and AMSes need 
to be modified to accommodate single sign-on functionality and management.  The 
existing Trusted Path Server (TPS) and Secure Session Server (SSS) processes on the 
MLS MYSEA Server will need to be redesigned to support SSO.  In particular, the 
design of how each process will handle user identification and authentication (e.g., 
querying the AUS, storing received user authentication information from the AUS, and 
dealing with user session updates from the AUS) requires extensive work.   
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Also to be modified or designed are the databases used by the AUS and AMS for 
SSO support.  The User Database on the AUS and AMS needs to be redesigned to keep 
track of the AMSes accessed by a user during a session.  The Application Mapping 
Database maintained by the AUS needs to be designed, as well as a database of valid 
AMSes that are allowed to query the AUS for user session information.  If multiple 
AUSes are involved, a database specifying which AUS the AMS should query for a 
user’s information needs to be designed.  A similar database would also be required for 
the TPE, so that the TPE knows which AUS to contact for authentication and session 
services and which AUSes to use in case of the failure of its assigned AUS. 
C. CONCLUSIONS 
Existing single sign-on solutions were studied and analyzed across a number of 
security and performance criteria.  As a result of this analysis, it was determined that a 
different kind of single sign-on solution would be constructed for the MYSEA 
environment.  A high level design of the MYSEA SSO solution was developed, which 
involved designing a new MYSEA architecture and the various CONOPS scenarios to 
illustrate how the MYSEA components support SSO.  The new architecture separated the 
authentication and application service mechanisms on the MYSEA Server, resulting in 
the creation of two separate entities: the Authentication Server and the Application 
Management Server.  Because the Authentication Server is the central component in 
providing single sign-on functionality, the AUS was the focus of study for the 
development of the security requirements for the SSO system.   
The requirements development process informally followed the Common Criteria 
methodology.  A threat analysis was performed on the AUS, and the environmental 
assumptions and organizational policies were established for the AUS.  From there, a set 
of objectives for the AUS was determined and these objectives were used to construct an 
initial set of security requirements for the AUS.  The security requirements were divided 
into functional and assurance requirements; these requirements were mapped back to the 
objectives, which had been mapped to the threats, policies, and assumptions.  The results 
of this work will serve as a framework for future design and specification of single sign-
on mechanisms in the MYSEA environment.   
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Single sign-on greatly enhances the usability of the MYSEA environment by 
allowing users to authenticate once to access applications on multiple machines.  Such 
capabilities may lead to greater acceptance of MYSEA solutions in the military and 
intelligence community.  The MYSEA single sign-on solution may even be applicable to 
the DoD’s vision of the Global Information Grid (GiG), where users are able to 
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